THE GEOPOLITICAL TURNING POINT AND RUSSIA

WHAT DOES THE NEW FOREIGN POLICY CONCEPT SAY

2023
FOREWORD

In March of this year, President Vladimir Putin approved a new version of the Concept of Russia's Foreign Policy. It was prepared against the background of a sharp aggravation of relations between Russia and the West in connection with the Ukrainian crisis, which was artificially provoked by external forces and led to a coup in February 2014. Since then, Ukraine has undergone massive militarization and Nazification, turning into a serious threat to Russia's security - not only military-political, but also at the level of identity and history, that is, the very existence of the historically established Russian statehood.

All Moscow's efforts to defuse the situation and turn the developments in neighboring and historically close Ukraine towards its transformation into a modern European country, including its federalization and settlement of the internal civil conflict on the basis of generally accepted norms and principles (the quadrilateral Minsk agreements of February 2015 were aimed at this), were sabotaged by both the Kiev authorities and western capitals. Moreover, Kiev, and then A. Merkel and F.Hollande publicly stated that they were not going to fulfill their obligations at all, and the signed agreements were thought of as a way to buy time for the rearmament of Ukraine. This fundamentally undermined Russia's trust in the West, which on the eve of the Russian military operation in Ukraine rejected Moscow's proposals to guarantee Russia's security in light of Ukraine's transformation into an instrument of its anti-Russian policy.

Russia had to react preemptively to what had all the signs of indirect aggression and turned into a hybrid war of a new type against it by the collective West. At the same time, Moscow acted openly and taking into account the lessons learned from its own history, including the treacherous attacks of the West - Napoleonic France in the XIX century and Nazi Germany on June 22, 1941. There is another manifestation of the eight-century "onslaught to the East" of Western civilization, which sees itself as a threat in the very fact of the existence of a Russia that is civilizationally alien to it.
There have been many convergence moments in the history of relations between the West and Russia, including the modernization of Russia itself and its role in creating a socially oriented state in the West, which for half a century ensured the sustainability of the development of Western society after its complex crisis of the early twentieth century, which resulted in two world wars. Now the situation is no less fraught with global conflict. The 400-year dominance of the West in world politics, economics and finance has come to an end. Neoliberal economic policy and the modern version of globalization have led Western society to a new crisis, the way out of which requires its transformation – no less radical than the one that Russia embarked on 40 years ago. But Western elites are stubbornly trying to maintain their hegemony, which has turned into a way of existence at the expense of the rest of the world. The greatest rent from this hegemony is extracted by the United States, which controls the global monetary and financial system created by them in the post-war period, based on the dominance of the dollar, which lost its gold collateral in 1971. The West had the opportunity to make its empire inclusive by co-opting other centers of the emerging multipolar system of global governance into it, and to avoid the current geopolitical revolution, which is considered a catastrophe in Western capitals. After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, America had the opportunity to focus on its problems, as far-sighted political scientists called for. But the choice was made in favor of NATO expansion towards the borders of the new Russia, which abandoned Soviet ideology and showed absolute openness to the West and the whole world.

As George Kennan warned, this "most fatal" decision turned into an acute geopolitical conflict with Russia, which, under the current conditions, can only recognize as an illusion the idea of "embedding" in the historical West and clearly and distinctly (for itself and the whole world) self-determination in accordance with its culture and history. This is all the more necessary because multipolarity reflects the cultural and civilizational diversity inherent in the world, which has been suppressed by the West for centuries, including in the form of neocolonial dependence of former colonial possessions and territories. It is the latter states that
make up the World majority, to which Russia also counts itself. Among them are other civilizational states, such as China and India. The West will have to pass a painful test of cultural and civilizational compatibility with the rest of the world, normalize itself as another civilization and another region. Events on the world stage are developing in this direction. The West is shrinking, not expanding, exposing itself to self-isolation from the vast majority of states and going to the creation of narrow closed alliances like the Anglo-Saxon AUKUS as part of the United States, Great Britain and Australia. So the origins of the current decline and "evolutionary decay" of the West lie in the politics of its elites, who do not want and, apparently, cannot adapt without shocks – internal and external – to the realities of the modern world, which has got out of their control.

The content of the Concept testifies precisely to Russia's openness to the world and its readiness to play a balancing role in world affairs, in line with its cultural and historical tradition to stand on the side of truth and justice. We are not closing ourselves off from the West, we are not abandoning the European part of our historical and civilizational heritage. But we will act according to the circumstances and our own understanding of our national interests. More than ever before, in this Concept, Russia acts as an absolutely predictable value of global and regional policy - a thing that is extremely scarce these days, and in this one can see a unique Russian contribution to ensuring proper certainty of world development, to the common affairs of mankind.
I. THE GEOPOLITICAL CONTEXT

President Vladimir Putin, in his Message to the Federal Assembly dated February 21, 2023, spoke of a "milestone time for our country", that it was "a time of challenges and opportunities". At a rally in Luzhniki the next day, he described the SVO in Ukraine as "a battle on our historical frontiers." The President clearly defined that once again Russia was faced with the aggression of the West, which was using Ukraine in its Soviet borders for its own purposes, preparing it for a "big war". The neighboring fraternal country was reformatted as anti-Russia after the coup that took place there in February 2014. The Nazi regime came to power, and the country underwent accelerated militarization, is being pumped up with Western weapons.

No one in the West now hides that behind the screen of the Minsk Agreements of 2015, approved by the UN Security Council and designed to resolve the civil conflict in Ukraine on the basis of internationally recognized norms and principles, the goal was to inflict on Russia, if not a military, then a "strategic defeat" in order to destabilize the situation in our country, achieve a change of power and create conditions for its dismemberment and nuclear disarmament. The West acted treacherously in its desire to finally resolve the "Russian question", once and for all, to resolve the conflict with Russia to the full historical depth, dating back to the first "onslaught on the East" by Western Europe under the leadership of the Roman Church in the first half of the XIII century.

Then, in 1204, Constantinople was taken by the Crusaders and in place of Byzantium, from which Russia received Orthodoxy, the Latin Empire was created, which existed for half a century. In the north, the Swedes and the Livonian Order responded to the appeals of the popes, starting with Innocent III, to fight against the "schismatics" (apostates), by which the Russians were understood. They were dealt a crushing defeat by Alexander Nevsky, who made his historical choice in favor of preserving the independence of Russia and the faith of its people as the basis of our identity, even at the cost of submission to the Horde. As history shows, Peter's
modernization, having eliminated another threat of territorial and political reorganization of the entire Eastern Europe in the interests of the West, introduced Russia into European politics and its layouts, which turned into the invasion of Napoleon in 1812, the participation of Russia/The Soviet Union in two world wars at the cost of the Russian Revolution of 1917, the Civil War and foreign intervention, as well as the Great Patriotic War. Russia has always saved the independence of European states from imperial encroachments, be it Paris or Berlin, at the cost of incredible sacrifices and suffering.

The Great Victory of 1945 over Nazi Germany formed the spiritual and moral foundation of modern Russia, and it was she who became the object of the current "onslaught on the East" with its not only military threat to Russia, but also a threat to our people at the level of identity and history, that is, its very survival and the right to historical creativity. If eight centuries ago Western Europe was under the leadership of the Roman Church, now it is under "American leadership". The Second World War eliminated intra-Western bipolarity, leading to the American occupation of Germany and Japan. And the new onslaught of the united West took the form of a "double expansion" – NATO and the European Union – to the East after the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR. Over time, Washington formulated its goal more clearly, taking into account the results of globalization, which led to the rise of China and contributed to the growth of multipolarity. Now we are talking about a double deterrence – Russia and China, which in Ukraine, due to the protracted nature of the conflict, is turning into a hot phase of a war on two fronts. Russia took the first blow, acting preemptively, without waiting for a repeat of the tragedy of June 22, 1941. Being unprepared for such a development of events, Washington risks losing the confrontation with the main challenge of its hegemony, China, already in Ukraine in absentia. This seems to encourage us to look for ways to negotiate a settlement in Ukraine, which, according to former Israeli Prime Minister N. Bennett, was thwarted in the spring of 2022 by the Americans themselves. Of course, the settlement is on its own terms.
Not the least important are the ideas about the cultural and civilizational characteristics underlying the worldview of Western elites. In October 2022, at a meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, President Vladimir Putin spoke about exactly this – that the basis of world civilization is made up of "traditional societies of the East, Latin America, Africa and Eurasia." At the same time, he noted "the disappearance of the creative potential of the West itself," its "desire to restrain, block the free development of other civilizations." It is impossible not to agree with S.A. Karaganov, who wrote (Rossiyskaya Gazeta, October 26, 2022): "The global meaning of the fight in Ukraine is the return to the non-West/The world majority, which was previously suppressed and robbed, culturally humiliated, freedom, dignity and independence. And, of course, a fair share in the world's wealth." The destruction of this foundation of multipolarity and a just world order has become the main goal of American foreign policy at the present stage. So, back in 2019, the current national security adviser to the President of the United States, Jake Sullivan, frankly wrote in the Atlantic magazine that the condition for the victory of the concept of American exceptionalism can only be "the defeat of the paradigm that highlights ethnic and cultural identity." It turns out, to destroy one identity with another – the Russian Ukrainian one, "divide and rule", as in the old colonial times? It was in this geopolitical context that the new Concept of Russia's foreign Policy was formulated, approved by Presidential Decree on March 31, 2023. It defines Russia for the first time as an "original state-civilization" among other states such as, for example, China and India, as well as as an "extensive Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power". That is, the task of our cultural and civilizational self-determination is being set, which was equally hindered by the autocratic and Soviet authorities. Moreover, Russia "as one of the sovereign centers of world development fulfills a historically unique mission to maintain the global balance of power." While maintaining continuity with previous strategic planning documents, the Concept creatively develops them and introduces other important innovations dictated by the imperatives of the current geopolitical situation. So, it talks about changing the system of regional priorities of our diplomacy, where the emphasis in the
development of cooperation will be placed on the countries of the non-Western world (or the World majority), despite the fact that we do not consider ourselves an enemy of the West, which "unleashed a new type of hybrid war against us."

At a time when "the role of the force factor in international relations is increasing", "the international legal system is being tested for strength", "the effectiveness of diplomacy as a means of peaceful settlement of disputes is decreasing" and "there is an acute shortage of trust and predictability in international affairs", Russia "intends to defend its right to existence and free development by all by available means," including the use of its Armed Forces under Article 51 of the UN Charter to "repel and prevent an attack" not only on itself, but also on its allies. Among other tasks, the restoration of the role of the UN as the central coordinating mechanism of the international system that developed in the post-war period, the "formation of a just and sustainable world order" based on the principles of the rule of international law and the indivisibility of security is being set. All this and much more relates to the building of our relations with the United States, which testifies to the overdue qualitative reassessment of the scale of the threat to us and the whole world emanating from Washington's claims to exclusivity and hegemony.

Probably, in this regard, we will have to admit that for a long time Russia was an indispensable participant in European politics, albeit with its own peculiarities, and the Soviet Union put into practice the products of European political thought, and by no means the worst, if compared with such specific products of Western civilization as colonialism and fascism/Nazism. Thus, the bipolarity of the Cold War seemed to be a kind of directory for the management of the world by Europe, the source of tension in which was ideological, military-political and other confrontation. And peaceful coexistence has become a form of freezing the conflict with Russia for the West.

The exhaustion of the current model of capitalism (world economy), the endless growth of consumption, the financialization of all industries, the blurring of the line between the real and the virtual lead to a fatal erosion of the ethical basis, thanks to which capitalism was once a mechanism for ensuring progress (this problem is also
relevant for Russia). The consumer socio-cultural way of life has reached an inevitable impasse. Actually, this is the source of the development crisis in the third world: everything was left to chance and left to the mercy of the market element, especially in the last 30-40 years, when the established mechanisms for promoting international development serve neocolonialism. It is precisely because of the position of the West that this problem, as well as the development of collective responses to transnational challenges and threats in general, is complicated. It is enough to refer to Washington's involvement, recognized by many independent experts, in the creation of ISIS from the remnants of the Sunni Baathist regime of S. Hussein in Iraq (the officer corps and military intelligence that were left out of business as a result of the American invasion). How can we cooperate when the United States participates in the creation of a regional terrorist threat, and then it is used to justify an attempt to overthrow the legitimate government of Syria and its illegal military presence in this Arab country?
II. THE CRISIS IN RELATIONS BETWEEN RUSSIA AND THE WEST: ORIGINS AND VARIANTS

With the withdrawal from the Cold War and the former intra-European arrangements, with the rejection of the former ideology and illusions about the goodwill of the West, with the restoration of the connection of times, historical continuity in its development, Russia is asserting itself as one of the cultural and civilizational centers of the modern world. It is such a Russia – having comprehended all the richness of its historical experience, including the positive elements of the European heritage – that will be able to make its unique contribution to world development and global politics in the current era of revolutionary changes.

The key characteristic of the latter, in my opinion, along with the decline of the West's dominance in global politics, economics and finance, is a kind of endgame in the centuries-old confrontation between the West and Russia, which, admittedly, abounded in convergence moments. The creation of a socially oriented economy in the West ensured the sustainability of the development of Western society in the post-war period, which was undermined by the transition of Western elites to a neoliberal economic policy combined with a new version of globalization.

The entire behavior of the West towards Russia, as the Ukrainian crisis convincingly shows, is quite irrational in its adventurism, threatening to balance on the brink of a nuclear catastrophe. In Russia, Western elites have seen and continue to see an almost existential threat – either they or we.

But the fact that Russia is turning to the East in the face of the hostile policy of the West does not mean that we stop fighting for the future of the entire European region as part of the European continent. In the meantime, the urgent task of reliably ensuring our security in the western direction is being solved. Let us not forget that we took up the baton of the ideals of the European Enlightenment when Western Europe embarked on the path of colonial conquest and imperialism, tried, albeit unsuccessfully, to prevent a "great war" in Europe at the Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 convened on the initiative of St. Petersburg, and in the post-war period proposed peaceful coexistence of two political and ideological systems.
Western Europe, the EU Europe, will sooner or later be renewed, which is hardly possible outside of cooperation with Russia, and will find its place in the new world structure. This will require a change of the current generation of Western elites. But for now we have an equally difficult path of creative bilateral and multilateral diplomacy to consolidate the non-Western world, which is the World's majority, to promote its liberation from neocolonial dependence, and in order of historical continuity with respect to the role of the Russian Revolution of 1917 in the awakening of Asia and the decisive contribution of the USSR to the process of decolonization in the 50-60s of the last century.

At the same time, we cannot escape the task of managing relations with the West, where Washington sets the tone. To succeed, we need to abandon the inertia of Western centromism, set not only by the late Soviet leadership, but also by the entire development of Russia over the past three centuries. Now, when the West is shrinking to the state of another region of the world, that is, it is regionalizing, revealing the inability to give the sanctions pressure on Russia a truly global reach (the detached or openly negative reaction of non-Western countries to the corresponding appeals of Western capitals is rightfully perceived as a foreign policy catastrophe of the West), we especially need our own, independent view of what is happening in the West society. It is experiencing its next complex crisis, comparable to the one that led to two world wars and the Great Depression of the 30s. Like any crisis, it is fraught with threats and opportunities. Threats include the prospect of a nuclear war, which is growing (recall that the previous crisis of Western society was accompanied by two world wars), opportunities – the liberation of the non-Western world (and we recognize, including Russia and China) from neocolonial dependence, its exit from the Western coordinate system, which otherwise would be problematic.

The inertia of Eurocentrism, coupled with faith in the goodwill of the West and the possibility of its voluntary transformation in accordance with the requirements of the time, led us to strive to become part of the West on equal terms. This course was defeated and by no means through our fault – there was no counter movement of the
West, proceeding from its absolute rightness, allegedly proved by the "victory in the cold war". Russia was opposed by the powerful inertia of the Western policy of containing everything that could create at least the slightest threat to its global dominance.

We are dealing with elites, and not with peoples who have their own and considerable problems with these elites, as indicated by the growth of protest sentiments ("populist", in the terminology of the elites) in Western countries: it found its expression, among other things, in the UK's withdrawal from the EU following the results of the referendum held in June 2016, and the presidency of D. Trump, which responded to the request of isolationism, which is more organic for the traditional American consciousness (which, by the way, it is in full agreement with the thesis of American exceptionalism and opposes the very logic of Washington's post-war interventionism). British researcher David Goodhart, in his book The Road to Somewhere, explained the phenomenon of modern Western populism in this way: as a result of globalization, society has split into a majority rooted in their countries and places of residence and adhering to what is left of traditional values, and a cosmopolitan minority, including elites, whose positions within their own countries have been undermined a threat. Accordingly, we are now witnessing a counteroffensive by Western elites, in which an external threat is in demand. Hence the radicalization of the West's course to contain Russia and China in the form of creating a Ukrainian crisis and exacerbating the Taiwan problem.

Western elites, nurtured under American tutelage in the conditions of the "unipolar moment" and non-historical in their worldview and attitude, do not even have an adequate idea of the Cold War, content with the thesis of the "victory" of the West in it and the "defeat" of the USSR, which for some reason Russia must recognize, and therefore submit to "American leadership". In other words, Russia is seen as a challenge to the global hegemony of the West, which has become nothing more than a way of existence for Western elites at the expense of the rest of the world, which determines the stakes in their confrontation with Russia.
It is the criticism of the state of Western elites and, presumably, it is not by chance that the last book of G. Kissinger "Leadership. Six Studies in the field of World Strategy", where Konrad Adenauer, Charles de Gaulle, Richard Nixon, Anwar Sadat, Lee Kuan Yew and Margaret Thatcher are taken as role models. The choice of candidates is clear – none of them radically challenged American leadership, whether it was Adenauer with his "strategy of humility", de Gaulle with his "strategy of will" (although this is debatable with regard to de Gaulle) or Thatcher with his "strategy of persuasion". Nixon (together with the author) "rebelled against foreign policy dogma" and achieved a strategic advantage over the USSR with his "equilibrium strategy" by establishing diplomatic relations with Beijing. However, for some reason, the latter should not relate to the current state of affairs, when the United States is pushing its strategic advantage over Russia in Europe. Rather, on the contrary, the logic of Washington's then Chinese policy (of which Kissinger is proud) at a minimum, it requires good relations with all sides of the US–Russia–China geopolitical "triangle", and not confrontation with Moscow and Beijing at the same time.

Another thing is important – and this directly contradicts modern trends in Western society and in the formation of their elites. Kissinger notes that all these leaders were distinguished by deep literacy, by which he understands first of all classical humanities education with compulsory knowledge of history and philosophy, in general the habit of reading, including fiction, which develops imagination and shows how the world works. Everyone had a religious upbringing that allowed them to form a long-term view of things. All were patriots with a "deeply rooted sense of national identity", not at all "citizens of the world with a cosmopolitan identity". For them, strength of character was important, which allowed them to go against orthodox ideas, resist group selfish interests and at the same time act with due restraint, pursue a moderate policy with "reasonable concern for the long-term consequences" of their decisions. Their experience of statecraft speaks in favor of a combination of "intuition and inspiration", but also the will and the need for solitude necessary for reflection. Which is not compatible with modern visual culture. All
were of relatively modest origin and professed "middle-class nationalism" (wasn't it he who took London out of the EU and brought Trump to power? But the author, as always, is not inclined to rock the boat and prefers to go into criticism from afar). All these properties underlie their creative approach to politics and the transformative nature of their strategies. It seems that Kissinger's ideas about deep literacy speak in favor of reforming the Russian education system, taking into account his own experience of the XIX century. (classical gymnasium) and the Soviet period.

All six of these leaders faced the phenomenon of "evolutionary decay" in their countries – the conditions that brought them to the forefront of politics. In his earlier work, World Order, Kissinger criticized Western elites for relying on the "automatism" of expanding the sphere of Western domination in the absence of alternatives in the world – as a consequence of the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the Soviet Union. He admitted that America's foreign policy failures during this period "critics may attribute to the shortcomings, moral and intellectual, of American leaders" who could not "resolve the ambiguous relationship between force and diplomacy." At the same time, he wrote about the "multipolarity of power" and the need to create an inclusive world. This time, he predicts that "a liberal and universal rules-based order in practice will give way for an indefinite period of time to at least a partially divided world." It is noteworthy that he speaks negatively about the "ideologization of foreign policy", considers it necessary to have constant discussions between potential opponents in order to "promote the cultivation of mutual strategic self-control skills," including with regard to the consequences of new technologies.

Of interest is his judgment on the current conflict around Ukraine: as a result of the events after the end of the Cold War, the entire territory from the established security line to the national border of Russia "turned out to be open to a new strategic configuration." Stability depended on "whether emerging solutions could calm the historical fears of Europeans of Russian domination and take into account traditional Russian concerns about the offensive from the West." Everything that went wrong
in Ukraine, he attributes to the "failure of the strategic dialogue." Kissinger is a master of diplomatic formulations, but even from them it is clear that he cannot but recognize the existence of a real security problem in the region, and having deep historical roots, which has not found its solution in recent years. 30 years within its natocentric architecture. He is not inclined to appoint the guilty, which is already a lot.

The topic of identity in foreign affairs raised by Kissinger deserves special attention. Now it is obvious that foreign policy is, first of all, identity politics, which underlies the understanding of national interests. Russia is no exception to the rule in this regard, especially in the face of the West's desire to destroy the very foundation of our identity. Former Secretary of State M. Albright, left out of work under George W. Bush, wrote that "we should all treat the transcendent issues of history, identity and faith equally deeply."

Robert Cooper, a former senior official of the British Foreign Office and the EU foreign policy apparatus, gives such an example. During a meeting in Nassau in December 1962 between J. Kennedy and British Prime Minister H. Macmillan raised the question of whether London needed an independent nuclear force (then they demanded renewal with the help of the Americans). Defending his position, the Briton (according to McGeorge Bundy) argued that "to abandon nuclear forces would mean that the UK is not a country that has gone through its entire previous history," including "resistance to Nazi Germany in 1940." He threatened his resignation and almost the departure of London into a kind of semi-neutral status. Hence the conclusion: the question was not about the confrontation of the USSR, not about how to deal with Germany in NATO and not about nuclear weapons in general, but about "Britain's perception of itself."

Zb was also engaged in educating American elites. Brzezinski, especially against the background of the failed presidency of George W. Bush. In his article "The Dilemma of the Last Sovereign" (The American Interest magazine for the fall of 2005), he wrote bluntly that the United States will not be able to solve any of the world's significant problems alone if it does not "devote its sovereignty to a cause greater
than its own security," which requires "a willingness to address common problems."
(with partners) and strive for a common understanding of our historical era."

Brzezinski himself called the "global political awakening" as a key characteristic of the modern era, that is, processes outside the historical West.

Both American political scientists – and this is significant – turn for arguments to the author of "The Decline of the Western World", who is given an informal anathema by Western officialdom. Kissinger is cautious and quotes only his opinion that "a born statesman is first of all an expert, an expert on people, situations, things...
(and has the ability) to do what he should without "knowing". I will add that Spengler characterizes the politician of Western culture: "A born statesman is on the other side of truth and falsehood... The great popes and English party leaders, because they needed to control the situation, followed the same principles as the conquerors and rebels of all times. Deduce the basic rules from the actions of Innocent III, who almost led the church to world domination, and you will get the catechism of success, which is the extreme opposite of any religious morality, without which, however, there would be no church, no English colonies, no American capital, no victorious revolution...". Brzezinski in this article allows himself to appeal immediately to Spengler, A. Toynbee and S. Huntington, whose conclusions "ominously relate to the modern global dilemmas of America." For Toynbee – it is "suicidal statecraft" when militarism was the most common cause of the collapse of civilizations; for Huntington, as a result of globalization, "American hegemony is retreating, followed by the erosion of Western culture, while local, historically rooted mores, languages, beliefs and institutions are being reasserted."

As for Spengler, his conclusion about the future of the West is important "as the culmination of the process of political decay" with the transformation into an "overly ambitious and increasingly Caesaristic civilization" (this is also called "imperial overexertion of forces"). In Spengler himself we find such a forecast for the period after the XX century: "The increasingly primitive nature of political forms. The internal disintegration of nations into a shapeless population. The slow penetration of primitive states into a highly civilized way of life" and much more, which
corresponds in Roman history (so dear to the heart of the American elite) to the first century BC to the second AD.

The category of "political decay" is operated by the equally authoritative (this does not mean that the elites listen to him) F. Fukuyama. In his study "Political Order and Political Decay," he warns about the generality of the laws of decay for all political orders and systems, especially institutions, moreover, "democracy itself can serve as a source of decay." With regard to America, he proves that "it is affected by the problem of political decay in a more acute form than other democratic political systems." But most importantly, "there are no automatic historical mechanisms that would make progress inevitable or prevent decay and rollback." Subsequently, on the pages of Foreign Affairs magazine, he concretized his diagnosis, pointing out that "due to intellectual inertia and the power of vested interests entrenched in the system, it is unlikely that it will be possible to carry out institutional reform without serious shocks to the political order." Recently, factors such as "the disappearance of a common factual basis for democratic discussions" and the transformation of political differences into disagreements over "cultural identity" have been added to them.

Even before his victory in the 2016 elections, Fukuyama perceived the Trump phenomenon as a choice between "political decay and renewal" (his article on this topic in the Foreign Affairs magazine for July–August 2016). He focuses his analysis on America's globalized white working class, demanding "economic nationalism" and now voting Republican, while Democrats have embraced Reaganomics. Trump at least broke up with her. He considered Trump and B. Sanders as a "great opportunity" to fix the political system experiencing dysfunction. We know what really happened during the elections and in subsequent years: the "deep state" and what Fukuyama calls "vetocracy" stood in the way of change. Moreover, the elites, especially after Covid, liked to act in emergency situations, and the Ukrainian crisis creates one for them, allowing them to control the "conditions of debate" in their countries.
America's problems, oddly enough, can help solve the Ukrainian crisis – the brainchild of the Democrats (the presidency of Barack Obama) and now turned into an acute form under the new democratic administration. Europe is suffering more than the United States from the sanctions boomerang and, it seems, is becoming a source of reindustrialization of America, which is facilitated by the Law on Reducing Inflation adopted in the summer of 2022. Thus, the United States, acting in the role of a classic status quo power clinging to its hegemony/empire, so far benefits from any shocks, even if they occur with allies. The artificially created crisis not only disciplines the allies, but also strengthens the conformism inherent in the Americans and correctly noticed by de Tocqueville, to which Fukuyama was no stranger. On the general wave of Russophobia, he announced the possibility of liberalism taking root in each individual country, that is, a kind of national liberalism, which brings to mind national socialism in the Third Reich, and other products of the ultra-liberalism of the Democratic Party completes the picture. Russian Russian culture and the Russian language are no longer to be surprised that at the same time they are abolishing Russian culture and the Russian language.

The important question remains whether the United States had other options for its foreign policy strategy after the end of the Cold War, whether it was possible to "normalize" America without shocks, and what can serve as a starting point for the current crisis in Western relations with Russia.

It is answered by the Americans themselves. The most quoted opinion belongs to the architect of the containment policy, J.To Kennan that the decision to expand NATO was the most fatal mistake in the period after the end of the cold war. Now everyone understands why. Thomas Friedman, a leading political columnist for the New York Times, wrote based on the experience of subsequent events: "We fired the first shot when we expanded NATO to the Russian border, despite the fact that the Soviet Union disappeared. The message to Moscow was clear: you are always our enemy, no matter what system you have" (June 25, 2015). Kissinger himself theoretically justified the strategic meaning of NATO expansion in the same 1994 in his "Diplomacy", and again appealing to history, which he knows well, but applies
selectively. It was about "reinsurance" in case Russia turns off the path of liberalism. He dismissed President B. Clinton's argument (at the alliance summit in January 1994) that such a decision would "draw a new line between East and West, which could become a self-fulfilling prophecy about future confrontation."

Anyway, the decision on expansion was made, and in the State Department to the Russian ambassador Yu. Vorontsov was told that there were no plans to invite Russia to the alliance. The process of alienation between the West and Russia was launched and its logic began to determine the Western policy of containing Russia "in reserve". At various stages, voices were heard, including analysts who passed through the State Department's Foreign Policy Planning Headquarters (Fukuyama also visited this position), in favor of a more moderate policy towards Moscow, the need to take into account its security interests even in the conditions of a nato–centric regional security system imposed on us and Europe - that is why the institutionalization of the OSCE, which until it still does not have its own Charter. Brzezinski in early 2014 proposed the option of "Finlandization" of Ukraine, that is, its military-political neutralization, in order to avoid a rupture of relations with Russia. Earlier in his book Strategic Vision, he warned about the West's limited resource of dominance and suggested taking a course to create a "bigger and more viable West" through the integration of Russia and Turkey into it – two Eurasian states, including Russia's admission to NATO in the future. He believed that the establishment of "historically binding relations" between the West and Russia would be facilitated by "Ukraine, not hostile to Russia." Among the missed opportunities, in his opinion, could be "a joint NATO-Russia treaty as the alliance expands."

I would add that the idea we proposed in June 2008 of concluding a Treaty on European Security (the text was transmitted in November 2009), which would consolidate the principle of indivisibility of security in the Euro-Atlantic, was completely ignored by the West, although the wording of the obligations of the parties proposed in it was quite flexible (in the spirit of the Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928) and did not demand the dissolution of NATO. Just as the draft documents submitted by us to the United States and NATO on December 15, 2021, were
rejected in order to resolve the problem of threats to our security on a contractual basis, by political and diplomatic means.

Strategist Brzezinski could not help but understand that it is the internal state of America, its society that forms the basis of its international influence, its ultimate foreign policy resource. The self-destructive presidency of J.Bush Jr. with his "war on terror" and the resumption of federal budget deficits (according to J.Stiglitz, one war in Iraq cost the country $ 3-5 trillion), the fanaticism of the Neocons surrounding him made many think about the future of the United States. Michael Mandelbaum simply wrote that the United States failed its mission in the world after the end of the Cold War. Brzezinski goes further: he draws a comparison with the fate of the Soviet Union, finding "several elements of alarming similarity," primarily defense spending and the dysfunction of the political system, and did not rule out "a historical decline reminiscent of the humiliating impotence of China in the XIX century."

The question of the renewal of the country rose to its full height, it would seem, at the peak of the power of the United States. It is not surprising that after J. Bush, Jr. Ideas also began to appear to revise the basic principles of national security, which had remained unchanged since the initial period of the Cold War (the National Security Act of 1947 and the NSC-68 Directive of 1950). A vivid attempt to launch such an intellectual project was the publication in 2011 by two military analysts under the pseudonym "Y" of the "National Security Narrative". Its contents were summed up by the then newly retired director of the State Department's Foreign Policy Planning Staff (this analytical unit was founded by J.Kennan) A.-M.Slaughter. It's about rethinking national interests, comparable to the "Long Telegram" of Kennan himself in 1946. Namely: the transition of the United States "from control in a closed system to a credible influence in an open system", "from deterring other countries to ensuring the sustainability of their own development", "from deterrence through intimidation and defense to civil cooperation and competition", "from zero-sum global politics and economics to positive sum", "from national security to national prosperity and security." This turn is summed up by the words of the then Secretary of Defense R. Gates and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff (JCS) Admiral M. Mullen about the need to "demilitarize foreign policy" and that the budget deficit is the greatest threat to national security.

The history of the West's drift in the issue of NATO expansion, as it happened, and contrary to the verbal assurances of Western leaders given to the late Soviet and Russian leadership, was described in detail and on the basis of previously unpublished documents by the American researcher M.E. Sarott in the book "Not one inch", which, coming out at the end of 2021, It became a bestseller and received many prizes, including being recognized as the best book of 2021 by Foreign Affairs magazine. The author concludes that with all possible options for the West to build positive relations of cooperation with Moscow after the end of the Cold War, "in the end, the temptation to continue (expansion) turned out to be irresistible without adequate consideration of its consequences." She quotes from a 1993 article in the New York Times by Stephen Sestanovich (then became a key figure in the State Department in the Russian direction): for all the doubts about the many alternatives (to NATO expansion), "these doubts are nothing compared to the disappointment and helplessness that we will experience if Russian democracy is defeated." Sarott also points out that the hasty dismantling of the Partnership for Peace (PFP), in which Russia also participated, in favor of the beginning of the expansion of the alliance in 1997 did not prevent the "rollback" of Hungary, Poland and a number of other Eastern European countries, which "emasculated many of their relatively new democratic laws and norms." She recalls that the issue of expansion was considered at the Senate hearings on October 30, 1997 with the participation of J. Biden: on the opinion of the former ambassador to Moscow, J. According to Matlock that abandoning the Partnership for Peace could "undermine efforts to contain the threat posed by the Russian nuclear arsenal," Biden then agreed that continuing the PFP "would be the best option."

M. Mandelbaum writes that the decision to expand NATO will be "in the historical perspective the most fraught with consequences for US foreign policy." Richard Haas, the head of the authoritative New York Council on Foreign Relations, agrees with him, who believes that "NATO expansion has definitely contributed to the
alienation of Russia." He himself, being the head of the Foreign Policy Planning Staff of the State Department under K. In 2001-2003, Powell repeatedly proposed not to curtail the PFP and even consider Russia's admission to NATO "as a means of integrating it into the status quo," but all these ideas did not receive support.

It is natural to ask whether there were other than inertial options for the internal development and international positioning of the United States in connection with the radically changed external conditions at the turn of the 80-90s of the last century.

It turns out that there were. This topic is raised by Peter Beinart in his book "Icarus Syndrome", published under the auspices of the same New York Council on Foreign Relations. He quotes such prominent thinkers of the conservative spectrum as Irving Kristol and Gene Kirkpatrick: the time has come for America to "become a normal country in a normal time", it is necessary to dissolve NATO, withdraw troops from Europe, reduce the defense budget and prepare for life in a multipolar world. In a word, "since the survival of the United States is no longer in danger, we must leave the barricades." They proceeded from the unreality of the fact that America can maintain the balance of power in global politics. There were no resources for this (the country was living in debt), nor the approval of the American people. However, they were opposed by those who believed that there is no "normal time". In 1993, I. Kristol also wrote that when the Cold War ended, a real confrontation began within the United States itself, for which they were "much less prepared ..., much more vulnerable." Signs of polarization in American society began to appear even then.

This opinion of S. Sestanovich about the causes of the collapse of the USSR is also appropriate: among them, he called the signing of the Helsinki Final Act and the fact that later the Soviet leadership "experienced illusions in relations with its (Western) counterparts."

Ian Bremmer, the founder of the Legal Group Political science Center, also contributed to the understanding of the international positioning of the United States in the new historical conditions. In his book "Superpower" on the eve of the 2016 elections, he argued for America to "lead by the power of its example" without trying to solve their own affairs for others - a variant of "independent America" (let me
remind you that Nigel Farage, who campaigned for Britain's withdrawal from the EU, led the United Kingdom Independence Party. Bremmer also argued that "Russia is too big to be isolated... Why did Washington get into an escalating conflict with Russia over Ukraine, a country that will always mean much more to Moscow than it does to us?"

In August 2021, an article by Wess Mitchell appeared in the National Interest magazine, "A strategy to avoid a war on two fronts." The author resigned from the post of deputy. Secretary of State for European and Eurasian Affairs in the fall of 2019, and a year later prepared a report for the Pentagon, on the basis of which he wrote this article. It is difficult to interpret it otherwise than as a mixture of Schlieffen and Barbarossa's plans to impose a forceful confrontation on Russia in Ukraine in order to take it out of the game before it is necessary to confront China. The United States does not have enough resources for a war on two fronts. Therefore, it is urgent to "stop Russia's expansion in the western direction" and deploy it in the east, at the same time, the alleged military defeat in Ukraine will destabilize Russia and lead to "regime change". The historical justification, as always, is selective – the Russian-Japanese War with the subsequent Revolution of 1905. Thus, light is shed on the real strategy of the United States, to the challenge of which we could not fail to respond. Moreover, this is a conspiracy not only against Russia, but also Europe, as further developments have shown.

At the same time, one can judge the generational change in the ranks of the American community, which is engaged in strategizing: those who knew the war and went through the experience of the wars in Korea and Vietnam were replaced by an untamed generation, a kind of Young Turks from political science, who seek to assert themselves, risking a new Caribbean crisis and balancing on the brink of nuclear war. Here it is appropriate to refer to the Briton Lawrence Friedman, who in his fundamental work "Strategy" writes about the relativity of any strategies, while referring to the statement of the American boxer Mike Tyson: "Everyone has a plan until they are knocked out." In the category of the latter, apparently, Russia's readiness for a protracted conflict in Ukraine falls, which was easy to foresee and
which means a complete fiasco of this American strategy, entirely calculated on the success of the blitzkrieg. Inevitably, the situation addresses everyone, including the Americans themselves, to the sad experience of Germany.

For Russia, in such an existential conflict imposed on it by the West, the main goal was a long-term and lasting solution to the security problem in the Western direction, which is not yet possible on a contractual basis with the West due to the complete undermining of trust in it after the seven-year experience of the Minsk Agreements of 2015, which, as Western leaders themselves admit, were used to reformat Ukraine in line with militarization and cultivation of Russophobic aggressive nationalism, which was quite successful. Rather, it is her decision that can serve as a prologue to subsequent agreements with the West, no matter how long it takes. Indirectly in favor of such an analysis is the desire of the United States to accelerate the negotiated resolution of the Ukrainian crisis on its own terms, that is, on the basis of the Ukrainian statehood, which (as anti-Russia) has become a threat to our existence.

The policy of the West in Ukraine, with the leading role of the United States, initially took Nazi Germany as a model. Accordingly, it is logical to assume that its collapse will also appeal to an analogy with the end of Hitlerism in Germany. The difference will be that the territorial and political reconstruction of Ukraine within the Soviet borders will take place differently, not by dividing between the great powers (Western capitals stubbornly insist that they are not parties to the conflict) and occupation, but through the will of the inhabitants of certain regions on the basis of the catastrophe that the Ukrainian statehood that has passed The path similar to Germany after Versailles is from a failed state and Weimarization to becoming an instrument of Western aggression against Russia, a kind of "landsknecht state". Nazi Germany had its own agenda in relation to other Western countries. Now, when the West is united and Germany is under American occupation, the Kiev regime has one goal – to use its status as a "frontline state" in the latent confrontation between the West and Russia as a way of national existence, in other words, its monetization.

The question is also what exactly attracted Washington, the ultra-liberal elites of America to independent Ukraine as a means of fighting Russia, imposing on us a
"last and decisive" clash within the framework of a course of inquiry, in diplomatic language, to prolong their global hegemony, to move away from their own transformation, which is long overdue, in the understanding of the Americans themselves. It is difficult to call Ukraine an established state when, with all its industrial potential created during the Soviet period, it has not been able to reach the level of GDP achieved before 1991. Of course, this is primarily a problem of the immaturity of the elites. The lack of experience of one's own statehood is also important. But a look at how the administrative borders of Ukraine were formed, with which it left the USSR, gives grounds to judge that, composed of parts that had a different history, and for centuries, Ukraine in such a configuration could exist only as part of the USSR. Therefore, the collapse of the USSR was the first catastrophe of an independent country. Misunderstanding of this, when all Soviet heritage was denied except borders, Ukrainization, which became total, and the growth of aggressive nationalism, cultivated at different stages by Vienna and Berlin in their geopolitical strategies (including two German occupations – at the Brest Peace and during the Great Patriotic War), the desire to keep the territory at all costs, did not taking into account the will of the indigenous population living on it, they led to the current second act of this tragedy. The nation did not take place, it turned out to be a repressive state fostered by the West, charged with aggression against Russia, whether it was military, which was not hidden in Kiev even before its own, or at the level of identity and history, including undermining the spiritual and moral foundation of modern Russian statehood, which is the Great Victory. At the same time, the West decides for itself the task of retroactively rehabilitating Nazism as a specific product of its civilization and absolving itself of historical guilt, which also applies to the Germans, judging by Berlin's attitude to its own.

History has not accidentally turned out to be a battlefield in our conflict with the West. The characteristic of the Kiev regime is only a detail in what can be called a battle of historical narratives. This, in turn, speaks about the global nature of what is happening. The West got a second wind with the collapse of the USSR. At a time when the processes of disintegration, ossification and decay there have passed, as
we can see from the example of the United States, quite predictably into an acute phase, non-historical Western elites are not averse to repeating this trick of history, attributing it to themselves as a victory. And here again Russia interferes, which rightfully plays this role and offers alternatives to Western domination, having entered the path of its transformation before the West. After the tossing of the 80s and 90s and "going to the West", we finally return to ourselves, admittedly, not without the help of the West, which consistently refused to negotiate with us on agreed terms.

Minsk-2 enabled Kiev to begin the transformation of the country into a modern European state, since the agreements reached met all European norms and standards for ensuring the rights of minorities and resolving internal civil conflicts. But the choice was made differently, and with the support or tacit consent of Western capitals. I will cite the opinion of a long-time critic of Russia, British journalist Edward Lucas, who, on the eve of the seemingly imminent defeat of the DPR/LPR, in his article in the Times dated August 12, 2014, made a rare admission for Western media: "Along with regular armed forces (in the ATO), voluntary militia formations are fighting with dubious (and sometimes disgusting) political views. What will happen to them when the fighting stops? Gangs of tough, self-confident armed men engaged in looting, expecting to be treated as national heroes, will undermine the country's fragile political system… Decentralization gives the greatest hope for peace and reconciliation in Ukraine." Then such assessments became taboo.

Both Ukraine and the West, and the United States in particular, give, I would say, a classic example of entering the path of external aggression as a means of solving internal problems by their elites. With regard to the Ukrainian crisis, we can also talk about an analogue of the Caribbean crisis, unleashed this time by the Americans at the Russian borders. Hence the importance in foreign policy planning of studying the internal state of our international partners, the prospects for their internal transformation in accordance with the requirements of the time. Slowing down reform processes, especially in the leading countries of the world, is always fraught with creating a threat to international peace and security, as happened in this case. It
can be said that Russia was declared war by the US decision to expand NATO back in 1994, when America was at a crossroads, and its elites opted for an inertial policy both inside and outside the country.

History has no direct paths – this is the most important knowledge for diplomacy. W. Churchill used to say that Americans will always do the right thing, but first they will try everything else. 30 years is a long time, and what Americans have not tried during this time. It remains to be hoped that by its firm position on the Ukrainian issue, accompanied by the rejection of illusions about the West and the restoration of continuity in its historical development, Russia will help America to make the right decisions for it. The whole world, which is on the verge of emancipation from Western hegemony and neocolonial dependence, will benefit from this. Like any freedom, this will require all Governments to make responsible and balanced decisions, to be ready for truly collegial work in resolving common problems for all, to finally overcome the legacy of the Cold War, its instincts and ideological prejudices.
III. WHAT KIND OF RUSSIA: PREDICTABLE AND OPEN TO THE WORLD

Only now is the meaning of the following conclusion of Oswald Spengler fully revealed in his famous "The Decline of the Western World", which was incorrectly translated as "The Decline of Europe": "Only the word "Europe" with the totality of ideas under its influence connected Russia with the West in our historical consciousness into one unjustified unity...West and East – concepts endowed with genuine historical content." Hence, quite practical conclusions for our international positioning. The Western centrism of the Soviet and more distant period, the intention to integrate into the West, was an absolute illusion and will remain so, at least until the radical transformation of the West itself in line with its gaining compatibility with the rest of the world, and therefore with Russia on the basis of genuine equality and collegiality. We can say that here, too, in the eyes of the whole world, Russia has become a touchstone for the West, primarily the United States, reflecting the key problem and at the same time the task of global politics and world development. It is also a matter of expanding the cognitive basis of our analysis. Now we can talk not so much about the dispute between Westerners and Slavophiles and soil scientists, as about the fact that the heritage of Western Europe over the past three centuries has exhausted its resource of promoting the development of our country. This gives a truly global, fundamental importance to the concept of our sovereignty – precisely at the level of ideas, culture and civilization, our own historical heritage in its entirety.

With our great Russian literature of the XIX century, we breathed new life into the humanistic traditions of European culture, which then seemed to be in a state of creative crisis. Dostoevsky gave the world the "new Gospel" at the stage of the progressive dechristianization of the West, along with Pushkin, Tolstoy, Chekhov and many others, he created a modern version of the Russian truth, which we were saved by during the ideological oppression and which, together with the Great Victory, serves as the spiritual and moral foundation of the new Russia, constitutes the content of our identity. N. Berdyaev, who also wrote about the "twilight of
Europe", believed that "the Russian people will justify their existence in this world at the last judgment of the peoples by Dostoevsky."

Spengler wrote about Dostoevsky: "Dostoevsky cannot be counted among anyone but the apostles of the first Christianity… Tolstoy's Christianity was a misunderstanding. He was talking about Christ, but he meant Marx. Dostoevsky's Christianity belongs to the next millennium." Tolstoy as a thinker "is connected with the West with all his gut. He is a great exponent of Peter's spirit, even though he denies it. This is invariably Western denial… This makes Tolstoy the father of Bolshevism." Let's recall Lenin's article "Leo Tolstoy as a mirror of the Russian Revolution." Our contemporary Archbishop of Canterbury (the highest hierarch of the Anglican Church) Rowan Williams, in his study of Dostoevsky's work from a theological angle, compares him to an icon. In his understanding, Dostoevsky "continues to ask his readers whether they are able to think that humanity only becomes itself when it is a reflection of the other – and, accordingly, what is the price of the relentless assertion of such humanity in a world that seems to do nothing but deny it. This is a literary, theological and political question at the same time. And unmistakably modern." This makes it possible to judge the global significance of our assertion of our identity and the motives of the West in its intention to destroy it. There is no doubt about it, more than ever, she stands in his way, marked nowadays by the mutation of liberalism in the direction of totalitarianism, anti–humanity and "transhumanism" - quite in line with the prophecies of Dostoevsky in his "Demons" and "The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor". If we don't stop it, as we stopped Hitlerism in the Great Patriotic War, then who?

The current aggravation in our relations with the West and the position of Russia as an "original state-civilization" in the new edition of the Concept of Russia's Foreign Policy served as an impetus to seriously engage in cultural and civilizational self-determination of the country. This is the main innovation of the new Concept, it is part of a broader conclusion that multipolarity, for which we have been advocating for more than 20 years, will reflect and express the cultural and civilizational diversity of the world, which has been suppressed for centuries by the global
dominance of the West. Such self-awareness is also required because without it we cannot understand why the Western elites behaved so irrationally (contrary to their secular culture of rationalism!), could not integrate the new Russia into the Western community and co-opt into the geopolitical world order controlled by them on decent terms and, in fact, rejected us as a partner.

The difficulty, however, is that for at least three centuries we have associated ourselves with Europe, believing that there is a European civilization and we are at least one of its branches. This approach was equally characteristic of both the autocratic government in the XIX century and the Soviet one in the XX century. Other constructions were rejected by the censorship, as evidenced by the "Letter on Censorship in Russia" by F.Tyutchev. What can we say about the Soviet era with its ideological dogma, which has become a huge cognitive limiter (even dissidents, like the Anglophile Duma liberals who carried out the February Revolution, demanded "more Europe" and "correct", that is, Western democracy)? After the end of the Cold War and the collapse of the USSR, our commonality with Europe was derived, among other things, from common Christian roots, although Christianity is an Eastern religion, and the West, where it gave truly "flowers of extraordinary beauty" in architecture and painting, literature and music, overcame the New Testament through the Reformation – due to the need to sacralize Anglo-Saxon capitalism (business success and a percentage of capital began to be passed off as grace). O. Spengler did not accidentally define the human soul of Western civilization as "Faustian" in its "flight into infinite space", while F.Tyutchev wrote that Christianity fully coincided with the spiritual structure of the Russian people. "Not by bread alone ...", "One's life for one's friends" and other Gospel truths fully expressed our identity as it manifested itself in history.

Therefore, the whole society practically proceeded from the fact that we are Europeans and almost the vanguard (in Soviet times) of this civilization. It can be said that since the time of the Westerners and Slavophiles, discussions on the civilizational status of Russia have practically not been conducted. The issue seemed to be resolved, if not in the era of Peter, then at least after the Revolution of 1917.
And then there is the participation, sometimes decisive, in European politics, the liberation of Europe from Napoleon and then Hitler. It was logical to assume against this historical background that we could integrate into NATO and the EU Europe, since we abandoned the ideology hostile to the West and in general ideologically disarmed. As it turned out, they were not waiting for us there, since they did not consider us their own at all. Only the Ukrainian crisis has made this clear. He showed that the West is one, that NATO and the EU are sides of the same coin, and that the double expansion was a coherent and mutually conditioned process.

There is no doubt that once we know ourselves and understand our difference from the West, we will be able to build a more purposeful and coherent strategy for our own development. Feel more confident in your relationship with the outside world. Moreover, to understand our mission in this world, what we can and are called to give him - in the development of what we have already given.

We must admit that we are not and have never been faced with a choice between Europe and Asia. This is a false choice. To make sure of this, it is enough to look at China and India – two other civilizational states, where the center of global economic growth returns after it migrated from there in the middle of the XIX century as a result of the Industrial Revolution and, I would add, under the volleys of Western guns that "discovered" China, Japan and India.

Of course, there can be no question of abandoning the European part of its historical heritage. We have taken over the baton of the best in European culture, not only in literature and music, but also in terms of the ideas and humanistic orientation of the Enlightenment, from the ideals of which the West has consistently moved away not only in the process of creating colonial empires, but also by bringing the same instincts into European politics, be it Religious wars, Napoleonic wars or two world wars. In the Elizabethan era, England in its own way skimmed the cream from the European Renaissance in the form of a project like Shakespeare, which modernized and ennobled the English language to a level where it could compete with French (a similar process took place earlier at the court of Francis I). Something
similar in relation to the West fell to the lot of Russia when it "responded with the
genius of Pushkin to the challenge thrown by Peter."
There is no need to cite the opinions of Western thinkers and politicians about the
difference between Russia and Europe – there are a lot of them (from de Custine to
Bismarck), and history itself has proved that Russia played an exceptional role in
the history of Europe and the world that no one else could play. And this is despite
the fact that we have never (with the exception of Bolshevism during the time of
faith in the World Revolution, although the same F. This was present in Engels' view
of Russia as the "weak link" of capitalism) did not pretend to exclusivity.
A century and a half ago, Tyutchev wrote that Russia should "only stay where fate
has put us. But such is the fatal confluence of circumstances that have burdened our
minds for several generations, that instead of preserving our thoughts about Europe
naturally given her a fulcrum, we have willy-nilly tied her, so to speak, to the tail of
the West." It seems that this period in the development of our thought has come to
an end and that now, in the era of big issues requiring resolution, we can no longer
postpone our cultural and civilizational self-determination, which is necessary not
only for ourselves, but also for the West and the rest of the world. And just think:
after all, we wanted to integrate into the West, which in fact would mean
perpetuating Western hegemony and our participation in the neocolonial robbery of
the non-Western world! Unless our entire history spoke about this, and then Russia
would have been a country that had gone through all this history, which then would
certainly have been a complete misunderstanding. By and large, this would be a
betrayal of the achievements, sufferings and sacrifices of dozens of generations of
Russian people.
We will need to resume studying the issue where our predecessors left off, namely
N.Y. Danilevsky, Tyutchev, K.N. Leontiev, Dostoevsky (especially his "Demons"
and "The Legend of the Grand Inquisitor", which preceded the dystopias of
J. Orwell), Lev Gumilev, A.I. Solzhenitsyn and V. Tsymbursky. It would not hurt
Pitirim Sorokin, who predicted the collapse of the consumer socio-cultural way of
life in the USSR and in the West. I would not exclude from this series Pushkin (with
his unsent letter to Chaadaev), Chaadaev himself, who is by no means as unambiguous as is commonly believed. And of course, Turgenev, who, according to L. Grossman, in his thoughts about the future of Russia, "pointed out the sign of salvation in the spiritual heritage of his nation," including "the universal significance of Russian creative culture." Undoubtedly, Spengler's thesis about the pseudomorphism of Russian civilization would be fruitful, confirmed by the entire historical path of development of our country, starting with the vocation of the Varangians and the Baptism of Russia: we have returned much to Europe in a transformed form.

Russian Russian literature in general and Dostoevsky in particular will also be relevant to the case of the judgments of V. Woolf (her essay "The Russian Point of View") and W.H. Auden on Russian literature in general and Dostoevsky in particular. After all, it is necessary to judge the tree by the fruits! Thus, V. Wolf writes that all Russian literature is about the soul, about its state of relative goodness, while "the English reader does not know what this very "soul" is eaten with. Modern English author Jeff Dyer in his book dedicated to the film "Stalker", which he regularly reviews since he first saw it in his youth, testifies that our art in the XXI century. it continued to fulfill its worldwide spiritual and moral mission. Whether we admit it or not, but in our literature, including Chekhov's stories about nothing, we overcame the European logocentrism of Modern times. The pinnacle was Dostoevsky's polyphonic novels with their "last questions" of being and dialogues "on the threshold" (M. Bakhtin). Hence the emancipated and undetermined "man without content" by J. Agamben is an idea that Western elites transfer into the mainstream of their characteristic biopolitics, the peak of which can still be considered Nazism.

A glaring difference in attitude, and hence in cultural and civilizational terms, makes itself felt in Ukraine when regime figures declare that their "religion is to kill Russians," and Western media broadcast it without being embarrassed by obvious racial hatred. Russian Russian authorities themselves do not talk about protecting the country and its people, their democracy, namely, about hatred of Russians and
everything Russian, to which they can only oppose embroidery and everyday Ukrainian, which has not produced great literature like Russian (with the participation of Ukrainians themselves, such as Gogol) or English (with the participation of Scots and the Irish). But you can't build anything on denial, and instead of a positive product (and who would deny the importance of Ukrainian folk songs for our common culture, including music, in which everything is harmonious and not a word of malice), we are faced with the preaching of some primitive, cave hatred. While in Russia they pray for their own, for their return healthy and unharmed to their families - not a word about the murder of Ukrainians, as it was with the Germans when the Red Army set foot on German territory. Inevitably, the conclusion arises about the conflict of two cultures - Western, as it manifests itself in the Ukrainian project, and Russian, which explains a lot and provides an additional argument for intercivilizational demarcation as the basis of a realistic policy in the Western direction. Maybe then, really, "Tse Europe!", and on this we need to close the issue and stop claiming to be European? Did the peoples of the USSR fight for such a Europe in the Great Patriotic War?

We thought the West was transforming just like us. But it is still proving its incompatibility with other cultures and civilizations on agreed rather than imposed conditions. But it is precisely cultural and civilizational compatibility that seems to be the most important feature of Russia, even on the terms of peaceful coexistence that the West now rejects. This does not mean that in the wider world community we will not defend our views, which are fundamentally opposed to the very way of existence of the West.

Exercises in alternative history also make sense. For example, if the Treaty of Bjork had not been a misunderstanding and would have determined the reorientation of Russia to Germany on the eve of the First World War, then it would have signified consent to Berlin's enslavement of France and the rest of continental Europe – something we did not allow during the War Alarm of 1875. A more aggressive charge of the German elite would then mean that a full-fledged German-Russian system would not have emerged in Europe and Eurasia, Russia would eventually
lose its sovereignty and the right to historical creativity and would become part of the corporate Eurasian space (perhaps initially "soft" - like Peronism in Argentina), propped up from the West The Second Reich and militaristic Japan from the East (by the way, the modernization of Japan on the Prussian model predetermined the similarity of the destinies of both countries in the XX century). Peter Durnovo's famous note to the tsar from February 1914 says exactly this. At that time, proto-fascist figures and practitioners (Zubatovshchina) already existed in Russia, the real meaning of which manifested itself in Europe during the interwar period.

This is also why, both then and now, Russia does not have the option of "civilizational indifference" (see the article by B. Mezhuyev in the RSE for September-October 2022). We can leave the West alone at the level of direct relations, but certainly not in the field of our participation in the common affairs of mankind - then we would cease to be ourselves. The fact is that the West is not ready to leave us alone, as if it believed in the correctness of Tyutchev's words that "by the very fact of its existence, Russia denies the future of the West." The Ukrainian crisis, the invasions of Napoleon and Hitler, and the Crimean War are about that, not to mention the entire history of our relations, starting from the XIII century and including the historical choice of Alexander Nevsky. Participating in the layouts of European and world politics, and this was inevitable, we were often forced to defend our right to exist. Even if certain Western partners enjoyed the fruits of our victories to a greater extent, there is no doubt that the history of the West without our participation would have been different and, most likely, sad, if judged at least only by the current trends in the development of the West, including "transhumanism" and attempts to overcome biological determinism in terms of gender. Are we on the way with this Europe overcoming itself? On the way to the USA, where the indigenous white America with its traditional values and its faith became the object of the destructive policy of the ultra-liberal elites, who, like the Bolsheviks in Russia, bet on marginal strata and a democratic World revolution? We have all seen it and have gone through this totalitarianism, and we always recognize it, no matter what colors it is painted and no matter how ideologically it is packaged.
Thus, with the current attempt on our identity and history, the circle of the Russian policy of the West has closed for eight centuries, which only confirms the correctness of Tyutchev and Spengler's analysis. Cultural and civilizational self-determination of Russia has been overdue for a long time and has become an urgent necessity. It is needed by both our friends and our enemies, but above all by ourselves. The Great Victory opened to us the veil over this mystery, which, as Dostoevsky noted in his famous Pushkin speech, the genius of the great poet left us. There Dostoevsky spoke about the universal responsiveness and universal vocation of Russia, which is confirmed by our entire history. As proof, he cites Pushkin's "Little Tragedies" and quotes Tyutchev's poem "These poor villages":

"Dejected by the burden of the godmother,
All of you, my dear country,
In slavish form, the King of Heaven
He went out blessing."

Earlier, in 1861, Dostoevsky wrote: "We know now that we cannot be Europeans, that we are unable to squeeze ourselves into one of the Western forms of life, which Europe has survived and developed from its own national principles, alien and opposite to us... We know that we will not be protected from humanity by Chinese walls now. We foresee... that the nature of our future activities should be extremely universal, that the Russian idea, perhaps, will become a synthesis of all those ideas that Europe is developing with such persistence... in its individual nationalities."

This should become an interdisciplinary and, of course, a public project, involving the general public, with debates in the multimedia space. Finally, we need to know where we come from, who we are and what is the meaning of our existence in this world in the concrete historical conditions of today. This task, of course, is set by the Concept.

The key theme remains our role in the Second World War. There is no doubt that they want to destroy our country from the inside, taking away our history from us. And this is where we have nowhere to retreat. The more important is the memory of the Victory for which we are fighting, including in Ukraine. More recently, it was...
possible to meet objective assessments of Western historians on this issue. So, the British military historian Max Hastings, in an article in the popular Daily Mail on May 7, 2015, in connection with the 70th anniversary of the end of the war in Europe, wrote: "If Hitler had not attacked Russia and the Russians would not have resisted with fortitude and a spirit of self-sacrifice that is unattainable in Western democracies, we might have continued to fight him to this day. It is extremely unlikely that the British and American armies will ever be able to defeat the Wehrmacht on their own." Aren't we talking about real cultural and civilizational differences?

Our victory in 1945, as well as the victory over Napoleon, is a vivid illustration of what in modern philosophy is called the "irony of an object" responding to the "banal strategy" of the enemy (Napoleon – to win the war in one or two border battles, Hitler - to reach the Arkhangelsk–Astrakhan line in the first three months his "fatal strategy", rooted in his identity, fate and historical vocation. As Jean Baudrillard notes in his Fatal Strategies (1983), "the object enters exactly the game that they want to force him to play, and by doubling the bet, in a certain sense outbids the price of the strategic rules that are imposed on him, thus introducing ... a fatal strategy for the subject." . What if this is not what represents our transition to a protracted conflict within the framework of its own in response to the attempt of the Western blitzkrieg, which encourages the West to improvise as events unfold? By the way, Baudrillard also predicted there that even within the framework of a nuclear confrontation, "a limited, so to speak, human, space of war can be recreated, and then weapons will regain their use value." Which also sounds very relevant.
IV. CONTINUITY AND INNOVATIONS

The problem of cultural and civilizational self-determination of Russia is certainly central to the new Concept. Presumably, that's why it was taken with hostility by Western capitals. Another element of novelty in the foreign policy analysis is the combination of the theme of multipolarity and the cultural and civilizational diversity of the world, which it will be designed to reflect. This approach has real consequences for practical politics, since the experience of the last year and a half, and by and large, the entire period after the end of the Cold War shows that the West, no matter how hard it tried, failed to move either Russia, China, or India from the positions of sovereignty and rootedness in its own understanding of its national interests, neither the Arab-Islamic world, nor the entire world majority.

Actually, that's why the Concept is truly innovative – it reflects what has become painfully obvious. There can be no question of any integration of Russia into the West/Europe. Russian Minister Sergey Lavrov, speaking at the XXXI Assembly of the Council on Foreign and Defense Policy on May 20, 2023, said: "It is clear that the Western "track" in the form in which it developed until recently in our foreign policy has completely exhausted itself. We have entered a phase of acute confrontation with an aggressive bloc consisting of the United States, the EU and the North Atlantic Alliance."

We are really alien culturally and civilizationaly, and we just have to admit it and find ways of coexistence, as it was in the Cold War. But even then, the initiative for peaceful coexistence came from Moscow, which at that time thought of itself as part of Europe, and only the presence of nuclear weapons combined with the Caribbean crisis convinced the West of the absence of other reasonable options for doing business with Moscow. The peculiarity of the current situation is also that now Russia is not needed to clarify intra-Western relations, as it was during the time of Napoleon, the expansion of Kaiser and Nazi Germany. The West is united as never before, and its elites are determined to defend their very selfish interest associated with the advantages of their hegemony/empire. Their control over the institutions of
the world order is presented as an "international public good", for the use of which non-Western countries have to pay, including to tolerate neocolonial exploitation, unfair terms of trade, the dictate of suppliers of industrial products, even if it is produced locally, but using Western technology, know-how, using Western brands, markets, etc. etc.

We have been approaching such a clarification of relations with the West for a long time, having gone through illusions and self-deception, attempts to appeal to the supposed rationality of partners, who, after all, would find it easier to integrate Russia (and China too) than to risk unnecessary shocks on a global scale. And didn't the policy of involving the Soviet Union give the results the West needed? It turned out that it was dictated by fear, and since he disappeared, then there is no need to "involve" him. Ukraine shows that neither the United States nor NATO were ready for a direct confrontation with Russia, but they decided to take a risk – quite thoughtlessly and recklessly – with the Ukrainian crisis.

Unfortunately, this is the reality that we and the entire non-Western world have to deal with. And the Concept could not help but dot the “I" here. It is quite natural that Europe and the Anglo-Saxons were at the tail of our foreign policy priorities. Moreover, it turns out a historical series that dictates its own logic: we consistently had to fight off the Poles, Swedes, French, Germans (twice), from all of Europe under Napoleon, in the Crimean War and under Hitler, and now it's the turn of direct confrontation with the Anglo-Saxons? So primitive that I don't even want to believe it! That's probably how the world works – ainsi va le monde! It can only be explained by the fact that on the other side they do not put history into anything and simply do not want to know it, which is what Kissinger points out in the book, which in its content is similar to a political testament. And it is difficult to say whether this is intellectual ignorance, or an elementary unwillingness to accept the world as it is (so much the worse for the world?), and not to risk making difficult decisions of a long-term nature on their own transformation despite the short-term nature of electoral cycles (after me, at least a flood?).
Of course, it was impossible for us, who believed in the innate rationality of Europe and took the baton of the European Enlightenment, to think that our relations would degrade so much that the West would decide to repeat history and sign the seemingly fraternal Ukraine for the role that was assigned by Western elites in the first half of the XX century to Germany. And they didn't invent anything: the same aggressive nationalism, only sharpened against "Muscovites", and not against all Slavs, made into "Europeans" through the expansion of NATO and the EU, plus militarism and "don't be afraid of anything – we are with you!". It seems that this does not happen, that it is at the level of hooliganism on the scale of a residential neighborhood, but it is.

Hitler was appeased and even pretended to be at war with him, once at the very last moment they gave guarantees to Poland (The strange war of 1939-1940, which the West does not like to remember). Washington, apparently, does not intend to give Ukraine any guarantees: such should be the preservation of the regime hostile to us in Kiev and its over-militarization, that is, the repetition of what has been passed. There are no institutional guarantees, be it the Austrian version of the State Treaty, "Finlandization" or a radical reform of the European security architecture, the nation-centricity of which brought us to the Ukrainian crisis, and, as mentioned above, is quite predictable, at least for professional political scientists and diplomats.

The turn to the East in our international positioning, and this is another innovation in the Concept, will be discussed below. The main thing is that it meets the imperatives of our internal development – after all, the Western policy of containment is aimed at slowing down our development, as President Vladimir Putin has repeatedly said. In the meantime, about the elements of continuity in the new Concept in relation to the strategic planning documents that preceded it.

First of all, it is necessary to note the theses on multipolarity and multi-vector diplomacy. They already appeared in the first concepts, but equally reflected both the forecast of geopolitical trends for the period after the end of the cold war, which was fully confirmed, and were a form of defending their sovereignty in foreign policy at the stage of weakening of the country, which had yet to confirm its status.
as a global power. If we play by the geopolitical rules, and they were set by the West, then we had to start with the effective use of force – in response to Georgia's attack on South Ossetia and Russian peacekeepers in August 2008, in support of the reunification of Crimea and Sevastopol with Russia as a result of the referendums held there in March 2014 (after the coup in Kiev in February of the same year and a limited military operation in September 2015 in support of the legitimate government of Syria, which became a victim of jihadist aggression.

It is the power arguments that are most intelligible for Western elites, especially when it comes to undermining their monopoly on projecting power beyond their own borders, which seemed unshakable before these events. Now the Concept states that Russia reserves the right to "defend its right to existence and free development by all available means." In the context of the increasing role of the force factor in international relations – this is a trend set by the policy of Western states that have unleashed a "hybrid war of a new type" against Russia – Russia is forced to use its armed forces in accordance with Article 51 of the UN Charter not only to repel an attack, but also to prevent it. At the same time, the authors of the Concept proceed from the fact that they have to deal with options for indirect aggression, as happened with regard to the Ukrainian crisis and aggression against Syria with the help of ISIS in the summer of 2012. No one openly declares war on us and does not engage in a months-long concentration of forces at our borders after that. So it was with Hitler's treacherous attack in 1941. The decision to expand NATO is no different, the true meaning of which was revealed by the Ukrainian crisis.

It is necessary to realize that multipolarity and multi-vector nature have always existed in the practice of international relations: these terms themselves simply did not exist - because they were unnecessary, since we were talking about things quite natural when there are several actors building relationships among themselves. In other words, we are talking about the return of interstate relations to their natural state of the era before the Crimean War, which launched the cycle of confrontational configurations in European and global politics that continues to this day. Russia's temporary withdrawal into itself (the famous Gorchakov's "Russia is not angry – it
concentrates") created the conditions for the unification of Germany as the Second Reich (and not the federation, which it became at the cost of two world wars) – without Russia's active participation, Europe could not prevent such a development of events. Moreover, it was Palmerston's cabinet that insisted on restrictive measures humiliating for St. Petersburg (on the Black Sea) articles of the Paris Peace Treaty of 1856. By an evil irony, Great Britain received in the person of a united Germany the greatest military threat for itself after Napoleonic France, from which the empire could not save it, but only an alliance with the continental powers – France and Russia. London has played out its "brilliant isolation" – a strategy that Washington reproduces in the form of "balancing from the sea" (offshore balancing), carried out in order to contain Russia and China.

This was followed by the diplomatic preparations of the First World War, which, as Kissinger agrees in his article dated December 17, 2022 in the British conservative magazine Spectator, became the beginning of a new Thirty Years' War in Europe, including the Second World War and the interwar period with its fascism/Nazism, fueled by aggressive nationalism, militarism and external aggression. Like the Thirty Years' War of 1618-1648, which was the apogee of the religious wars in Europe caused by the Reformation, its counterpart introduced into international relations a new version of value antagonism between states – an ideological confrontation that determined the content of the Cold War. Within the framework of the Peace of Westphalia, the European powers agreed to take ideological contradictions beyond the framework of interstate relations for the sake of peace on the continent. Without this, there would be no prosperity in Europe, capitalism with its "Protestant ethics" and the continent would fall into barbarism and self-destruction. The two world wars, rooted in the rise of ideologies after the French Revolution, were similar to self-destruction - they became official and served as a replacement for the previous antagonisms on religious grounds.

The Westphalian principles – the sovereign equality of states, non-interference in internal affairs and respect for territorial integrity - were enshrined in the UN Charter following the Second World War. Despite the military-political and ideological
confrontation of the Cold War, they provided a minimal framework for maintaining international stability and security. And this is despite the fact that along with the post-war international legal order with the central role of the UN, there was a geopolitical world order that limited and distorted the functioning of the former. Thus, multipolarity, fixed in the form of the principle of unanimity of the permanent members of the UN Security Council and designed to encourage the leading states of the world to negotiate among themselves, has been replaced by the bipolarity of two superpowers and two systems with opposing ideologies.

The end of the Cold War (the Soviet Union just came out of it, as it came out of Afghanistan) and the collapse of the USSR created the conditions for overcoming ideological confrontation and the complete triumph of Westphalian principles. And indeed, the UN has worked more effectively: in the first 20 years after 1989, the number of UN Security Council resolutions has tripled compared to the entire previous period of the Organization's existence, and this is after all 44 years. However, if the new Russia abandoned Soviet ideology and ideology in general, the West did not do it. His ideology, adjusted for the neoliberal economic policy of the early 80s and globalism based on it, were seen in Western capitals as an ideological driver of the "automatic" spread of Western dominance to the rest of the world. The "unipolar moment" in politics and the market element in the economy became a recipe prescribed to the world by Western elites with the leading role of the United States. This inertia denied any fresh outlook on things and any steps to adapt to a qualitatively new situation in the world and fraught with both new challenges and new opportunities. We can say that 30 years have been wasted, unless, of course, we count the accumulated negative experience, including its apogee in the form of the current hybrid confrontation and open economic war between the West and Russia. Therefore, we can say that the time has come for the return of world politics to common sense and positive historical experience, in the direction of which cultural and civilizational multipolarity and multi-vector diplomacy, literally outlived by the West from the practice and theory of international relations, point. It must be admitted that over these 200 years, if we count from the Industrial Revolution and
the Crimean War (by the way, the Civil War in the United States also mattered, which led to the unification of the economic model of America itself), the world has become truly global, but on the terms of Western hegemony. Now the global world has grown out of this hegemony, which has been reduced exclusively to providing global/neocolonial rent to the West and has become a straitjacket of world development (by the way, it is more appropriate for the West to criticize the decline of Spain, which existed due to the withdrawal of gold from America, and did not produce a "simple product": geopolitical rent is the same gold of that period). It is the triumph of the Westphalian Principles that can ensure a positive transformation of the world, creating conditions for the free development of all cultures and civilizations. This is already happening in the form of the regionalization of world politics and the growth of regional development clusters.

The very matter of development and international relations, embodying the value, ideological and practical political wealth of the world, is becoming too vast and diverse for unification and control by one world center. For this, the West has neither sufficient resources, including military-political and economic, nor internal reserves, depleted by the need to resolve another (after the eve of the Great Depression and the late 70s, when the choice was made in favor of reaganomics/Thatcherism, encroaching on the diversity of socio-economic practices already in the Western community itself) complex the crisis of Western society. At the same time, capitalism is asserting itself, requiring both "creative destruction" and stability. Trump proposed ways of internal "concentration" for America and the West as a whole, but his revolution, which was labeled with the same label of "populism", was strangled by ultra-liberal elites with the help of a "deep state". Just the stability of the Western elites were not able to provide.

Evidence that something is wrong in the West is the important fact that Russia, under unprecedented sanctions pressure, has once again entered the top ten economies of the world, and its economic growth rates in crisis conditions for all exceed similar indicators of a number of Western countries, including the UK. It can be assumed that factors such as the growth of the military-industrial complex in connection with
its own and import substitution affect, but probably not only them. The question may be much broader and fundamental - about a radical redistribution in the global economy in favor of natural resources and basic factors of life support. It is the exhaustion of resources that seems to be the source of new biopolitical constructions in part of Western elites, which may be indirectly indicated by Elon Musk's statement that J.Soros, the "gray eminence" of their top, "hates humanity."

In particular, in this connection, the question of cultural and civilizational self-determination of Russia, prophetically posed by Tyutchev, arises. The set of Western ideas and practices, as it has now become obvious, very far from common sense and humanism, has exhausted itself. Should we hold on to these "bottoms" – that's the question, and it is put in the Concept. The circle has closed in this regard, as have the great cycles of European and global politics, the course of the West to contain Russia and the development of international relations as such. We have to develop a set of coherent ideas on all these issues and do it in full understanding of the historical continuity and connection of times in our development, in different ways and at different historical stages, interrupted and distorted. Russian Russian idea, like Dostoevsky's, or Russian truth, borrowed from Yaroslav the Wise, but the essence should be the same - to return to their spiritual and moral origins, to themselves and on this basis to determine their place and role in the world of today. To do this, we will have to rethink not only our entire historical experience, including the Soviet one, but also the entire history of mankind, from which the West excluded other cultures and civilizations under various pretexts, while simultaneously generating a vast layer of its own mythology, which became a powerful cognitive limiter of our view of the world and our own development, and not only intellectual. It follows from this that we should not pass by Kissinger's advice to the Western elite and we could start with history as the basis of the whole process of understanding ourselves and understanding the meaning of our being in this world. The latter is clearly present and scattered in various manifestations of our spirit – this is evidenced by the persistent eight-century policy of restraining our development by the West. Statements from the outside, including Bismarck and
Field Marshal Minich, that Russia is a God–kept country are far from accidental. This trust cannot but be justified, as our ancestors justified it by doing so, because they could not otherwise. We need to get out from under the accumulated rubble in order to understand what else we should set limits to besides the "flight of the Faustian soul of the West into infinite space", and then it will become clear what we should do in foreign policy, how to position ourselves in world affairs. There is no doubt that our Great Victory will be the most important landmark here – it is not for nothing that it has become the main goal of Western policy in recent decades, including the notorious Ukrainian crisis.
The conditions for conducting Russian foreign policy have changed radically. An analysis of the causes of the contradictions that led to the confrontation between Russia and the West, as well as the strategies of the parties, indicates that the long-term goal of Russia's foreign policy can no longer be to integrate into the system of international relations de facto created by the collective West, in which it still has a leading position by inertia, despite its objectively declining weight. This system and the entire Western mythology as a whole, and not just the organizations in which the West dominates, are the source of its influence. The goal of the Russian Federation's policy may be to form, together with other interested parties, a new model of the world order in which there will be no hegemons, but a kind of collective leadership, something intercivilizational, based on the UN system and universal international instruments adopted in the period before the "unipolar moment". The movement towards the realization of this goal requires the maximum use of the resources of Russia's foreign policy and the reduction of the sources of its vulnerabilities in the face of the radicalization of the hostile policy of the West, as well as the demythologization of its imaginary advantages as a "supplier" of international goods.

A battle is unfolding for the future of Russia, Europe, the West and the whole world, for the survival of Russia as a sovereign state, which has finally begun to realize itself as such, a peculiar civilization, as a form and method of existence of the people of Russia, guarantees of their right to historical creativity. The country is moving away from the Western, Euro-Atlantic civilization in its modern form and after 300 years of "walking through torments" returns to itself, leaving behind a useful but bitter experience of participating in intra-European/intra-Western layouts with the need to choose between its own existence and the loss of its civilizational identity, which, despite everything, it managed to preserve. This can be called historical Russia, which found itself again, as it was under Alexander Nevsky or in the Time of Troubles, face to face with the historical West.
Theoretically, in the future, we can expect a relative normalization of relations with the West, for the beginning of the economic one – in the event that more nationally oriented elites come to power and they recognize Russia's national interests. Inevitably, more authoritarian regimes coming to power may also carry additional dangers. But even with the positive dynamics of relations, there will be no return to the relatively predictable past. Fascization of some Western countries is almost inevitable, support for the Nazi regime in Ukraine is the first sign: failing elites turn to ultranationalism and marginal strata, the clampdown on freedom of speech and dissent.

The conflict with the West, due to its "creeping" escalation of its involvement in Ukraine, already has all the signs of "balancing on the brink of war". Cleared of the opportunistic mythology of the late Soviet period, the experience of the Soviet Union, when under N. Khrushchev, a policy formulated as "A special way of implementing foreign policy by threatening war to the imperialists", and these were the Berlin, Taiwan and Caribbean crises, a back-to-back strategy with China, proved its effectiveness. This line was not carried out from scratch, but was supported by an economic and technological breakthrough, as well as our leading role in the implementation of the decolonization process. These lessons are also in demand in the current situation.

Over the past two decades, Russia has managed to consolidate internally, strengthen its state sovereignty, and recreate the economic and especially military basis for conducting an independent foreign policy. In the post-Soviet space, especially after 2020, it was possible to strengthen allied relations with Belarus. The Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), as well as the CSTO, which has once again proved its usefulness in Kazakhstan, persists and develops, despite unfavorable conditions and external opposition. But the aggravation of crisis phenomena in the world is increasingly threatening the internal stability of a number of key neighboring states. We have managed to preserve and increase our foreign policy independence and the position of the guarantor state of the democratization of international relations, their liberation from the pressure of hegemonism, in the direction of multipolarity and
multiplicity of value systems, cultures and development models. She is universally trusted, and she is also believed in the West – hence such an irreconcilable position towards Moscow.

The achievement of the Russian foreign policy of the last decades is the consistent development of relations with China, which are officially characterized as "more than allied", "having no borders" and which at the same time do not restrict the freedom of maneuver of the two powers. An important result of Russian-Chinese cooperation was the beginning of the formation and expansion of "Greater Eurasia" – a space of geopolitical stability and cooperation in the center of the continent, within which the power rivalry is being overcome. Strong partnership relations with China are an essential resource of Russia's global policy.

Russia also manages to strengthen the strategic partnership with India, which weakened in the 1990s, but which, however, is still based on a relatively narrow economic base. Expanding the basis of Russian-Indian relations and helping to mitigate Sino-Indian contradictions are becoming strategically important tasks of Russia's foreign policy.

Having returned to the Middle East in the 2010s after a 20-year hiatus, Russian foreign policy managed to take a truly strategic position in the region, and not on the basis of dictate, but an elementary demand for regional policy – as a mediator and mediator. Working relations have been established with leading regional players – Turkey, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, the UAE, as well as with Israel. Excellent knowledge and understanding of a complex region, clear and honest formulation of Russian interests in each of the country's directions, pragmatism and flexibility combined with the effective use of military force (Syria) contributed to the fact that the Middle East has probably become one of the most successful regional areas of modern Russian foreign policy, and here trust in Russia, as nowhere, huge. Russian policy towards the countries of Southeast Asia has noticeably intensified.

The failure of rapprochement with the West has become a valuable, albeit very expensive lesson for us. Having mastered it, Russia can build its policy no longer as an appendage of the West, but as an independent state-civilization, freely interacting
with the countries of the World majority in the formation of a new world order that meets the global demand. Not only the interests, but also the very attitude of Russia corresponds to an order free from the hegemony of one country, group of countries or any one civilization. Russia has a foundation for such a policy.

Since the late 2010s, Russia's policy towards sub-Saharan Africa has intensified. Relations with Latin American countries have revived – not only with Cuba, Nicaragua and Venezuela, but also with large states – Argentina, Brazil, Mexico.

At the level of global international institutions, Russia's positions have come under pressure, which is explained by the fact that most of these institutions are under the influence of Western states. While Russia has the right of veto in the UN Security Council and often acts jointly with China, anti-Russian resolutions in the UN General Assembly still receive the support of the majority of the international community. However, this majority no longer joins the anti-Russian policy in the economic sphere, and at the level of bilateral relations. This is a major change from the last Cold War. The West is noticeably weakened. In the specialized UN bodies – the World Trade Organization (WTO), the World Health Organization (WHO), the World Bank (WB) and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) – Russia's influence is minimal. However, the influence of these organizations is weakening, which is the result of the crisis of the entire Western system of international coordinates. The Americans themselves have paralyzed the functioning of the WTO dispute resolution mechanisms. It seems that the very fact of China and Russia's admission to the WTO has become a death sentence for this organization. Washington was not at all ready for such inclusiveness, including psychologically. Russia's cooperation with the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and, of course, the IMF/World Bank has lost its relevance. It can be assumed that the more institutions controlled by the West will be destroyed, neutralized and paralyzed, the better. Beijing is simultaneously building an alternative architecture, whether it is the AIIB, the VREP or the "One Belt, One Road" initiative, which, if we think in terms of classical geopolitics, can be qualified as an anti-Rimland.
The strengths of Russian foreign policy in the current conditions are a high level of political cohesion of society; a high degree of provision of natural resources for industrial and agricultural production; powerful intellectual potential; a strong state tradition; rich experience of participation in world politics, including experience of both cooperation and struggle with leading states (China is just gaining it); modern armed forces, including those with nuclear missile capabilities, which so far give an advantage in the strategic sphere; high-class foreign policy and diplomatic apparatus; the ability of the political system to make quick decisions (this is our common advantage with China over the West); geographical location, providing direct physical contact with the countries of Asia, the Middle East and Europe, as well as access to three oceans - the Pacific, Arctic and Atlantic.

However, radically changed conditions require a significantly updated foreign policy course. It should be tightly synchronized with domestic policy, primarily economic. While preserving the basic principles of Russia's foreign policy, such as commitment to the sovereignty and independence of the country and multi-vector nature, this course cannot but differ, and in a significant way, from the foreign policy of recent decades. The situation leaves no room for past understatement and uncertainty regarding the United States and NATO, which have declared a course of hostility and tough deterrence and even the "rejection" and destruction of Russia with the obvious unreality of such goals.

It is obvious that the West is no longer and will not be in the foreseeable future a potential external resource for our development and, on the contrary, will try in every way to restrain it, while the World Majority (MB), pursuing, of course, its own interests, is interested in mutually beneficial economic and other cooperation with Russia. As never before, a sober, through the prism of risks and opportunities, analysis of promising trends in global development and current events will be in demand. As well as our capabilities in their dynamics.

The role of classical multilateral diplomacy within the framework of the old crumbling system will be reduced. Bilateral and regional diplomacy with an emphasis on the key countries and organizations of the World majority with the
transformation of Russia into one of its supporting structures comes to the fore. It will be necessary to overcome the ideological and at the level of practical policy inertia of the late Soviet and early Russian periods, including the experience of detente and the Helsinki process, which were not carried out on an equal basis and became one of the reasons for the collapse of the USSR.

Our withdrawal from the Western system deprives it of universality and undermines its legitimacy. An alternative to relying on the existing system should be the full development of cooperation on a bilateral basis and within the framework of forums with our participation with conditionally 20 leading non-Western global and regional powers, nine of which are in the "twenty".

The processes in the regions of the global South will determine the main trends of human development in the medium term. The question is whether these countries will be able to emancipate sufficiently to create alternative institutions, platforms and communication formats to Western ones that would meet the goals of their national development. It is this question that Russia, which can become one of the Majority leaders, should help them answer. This global majority is emerging from neocolonial dependence, which was manifested, in particular, in the refusal to follow the economic sanctions of the West – with the continued external political support of the Western line in the UN. But this majority is heterogeneous, it is only being formed.

The states that are peaceably disposed towards us, with rare exceptions, are not Russia's allies. But traditional allied relations are also going out of fashion, like-minded people and partners are another matter. A hard split of the world into two camps as a result of the conflict in Ukraine has not yet occurred. A geopolitical "gray zone" has been formed. The economic system of the modern world is mainly controlled by the globalist forces of the West. In the global information environment, the West also dominates so far. Many of the countries that refused to join the sanctions are forced in practice to take into account the sanctions restrictions imposed by the United States and its allies in order to avoid secondary sanctions already against their countries. Nevertheless, the emergence of a large group of new
neutral states (historical European neutrals immediately abandoned their neutrality during the conflict in Ukraine and joined the United States) is an important factor in world development, indicating a narrowing of the sphere of influence of the collective West. SVO has only reinforced the trends that have been developing for some time in the depths of international relations. It became a turning point and a catalyst for these trends, in fact, led to the emergence of the phenomenon of the World majority striving to achieve political independence or, at least, military-political autonomy in relation to the United States and its allies. And most importantly, for the most part – to solve the problems of their own development on the basis of overcoming neocolonial dependence on former metropolises.

The world majority is becoming the most important resource of Russian foreign policy. The existence of an uncontrolled or not fully controlled Majority makes it impossible to isolate Russia in the world, significantly limits the effectiveness of anti-Russian sanctions. Russia itself is an active member of this majority, its most important geopolitical and military resource. It demonstrates in the most vivid and open form a commitment to sovereignty, economic self-sufficiency, intellectual independence, spiritual and cultural identity, as well as the ability to stand up for oneself and help others.

In terms of cultural and civilizational compatibility, stemming from the very nature and path of its historical development, the Russian identity, the Russian state directly opposes the Western worldview and political culture of Western elites, accustomed to acting by methods of coercion and violence, dictate and control.

The concept of the World Majority is not, in fact, an anti-Western idea, but the idea of liberating the whole world, including the countries of Europe, Japan and others, from the hegemony of the United States of America, which pursues the goal of unifying all mankind on the basis of one globalist model and which exists to the greatest extent at the expense of rent provided by its global dominance (allies As recent events show, they suffer from the unpredictability of American politics no less, or even more. Washington "orders music", and they have to pay). This is a
dystopia, but the desire to put it into practice is the source of the military threat in the world and its destabilization.

The New world order is not another edition of the Concert of Powers, but a polycentric model in which constructive interaction of sovereign states and civilizational platforms excludes the hegemony of one state or group of states.

The main functional directions of the Russian strategy in relation to the World majority are: accelerated development of the eastern regions of Russia itself – Siberia and the Far East, directly in contact with Asian countries; development of trade and economic ties with traditional and new partners; implementation of joint technological projects; development of new logistics corridors to enter the world market (in order to compensate for the blocking of logistics in the western direction by developing links in the meridional direction, such as the North-South corridor connecting Russia with Iran, India, Pakistan, the countries of the Near and Middle East, as well as sea routes around the Eurasian continent, including the Northern Sea Route); formulation of the Russian vision of UN reform, which would include, in particular, the inclusion of India, Brazil, representatives of the Arab-Islamic world and Africa as permanent members of the Security Council, as well as the introduction of rotating semi-permanent membership for 12 regional powers (which would reflect the civilizational structure of the world) with a total number of members of the Security Council within 23 (in order to preserve the compactness of the Council, the problem of overrepresentation of Western civilization, its Anglo-Saxon segment and EU Europe requires a solution).

We can also talk about helping partner countries to strengthen national security; formulation and promotion of Russian and joint world agendas with like-minded countries in such areas as assistance to developing countries, sustainable development Goals, global food security and many others; promotion of the principle of democratization of information (coordination of the positions of the World Majority countries on Internet regulation and social networks, the fight against censorship of the largest technology companies in the West, the elimination of digital inequality); contributing to the strengthening of regional security.
Active entry into the education markets of Asia, Africa and Latin America: an increase in the number of foreign branches of leading Russian universities; expansion of training in Russian universities of specialists for the countries of the World majority; creation of network universities.

The formation and dissemination of the global information agenda, the development of meanings and narratives for a worldwide audience, defending the values and interests of Russia and the Majority countries.

The main regional priority of foreign policy is the shock build-up of ties with the non-Western world on a bilateral basis, as well as in the format of regional and sub-regional clusters. The special emphasis on strengthening semi-union relations with China and deep strategic partnership with India is understandable. It would be possible to expand the sphere of interest of our non-Western partners through initiatives for their self-organization in completely applied areas of development. By acting in this way, we would maintain the flexibility that non-attachment to formal structures implies, which would serve as a welcome alternative for everyone who is tired of the rigid discipline of Western institutions with their supervision and interference in internal affairs.

In any case, it is in Russia's interests to diversify ties with other Asian countries as much as possible, including the ASEAN countries. The Chinese presence in the Arctic is not a challenge, but in the foreseeable future it is more an opportunity, especially if other interested non-Western countries are involved there. Serious prospects can also develop with the correct positioning of our relations with Turkey. The same is already happening with Iran.

The Middle East should, of course, remain one of the priorities of Russian policy in the non-Western world, and its place in the system of foreign policy priorities should increase in the coming years. The region is the embodiment of an emerging polycentric system – with the absence of one hegemon and sharply increased independence of the leading regional players.

Institutionally, Russia's priority is its own organizations of the World's majority countries, in which Western countries are not represented. First of all, this is the
development of BRICS on the principle of an open architecture as a world-class institution for formulating a global political and economic agenda and coordinating the efforts of the leading Majority countries on the most important issues, in fact, creating a prototype and "running-in" of a universal organization of a new type. Expansion and improvement of the effectiveness of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO). At the SCO summit in Samarkand, the queue for its expansion clearly declared itself – Iran joined the organization, and Egypt and Qatar received the status of a dialogue partner. All this is at the expense of states that are tired of the forceful pressure of the West. This dynamic indicates a growing multi-vector nature in the politics of non-Western countries, speaks of their desire to at least not put all their eggs in one basket, which is already a lot and which obliges us to step up efforts on this platform. In the economy, the most important task of the SCO is to develop the internal connectivity of Greater Eurasia, which in many respects remains too dependent on sea routes. Finally, there is a task of great importance – the development of cultural, scientific, technical, humanitarian exchanges between the peoples of the continent, who often communicate more with distant partners than with immediate neighbors.

The time has come to dramatically intensify work with all regional organizations and associations, including APEC, the African Union, regional development banks, etc. It is these countries and organizations that can become the core of the trade and financial and economic architecture, an alternative to the Western one. Cooperation within the framework of OPEC+ and with gas exporting countries is in demand in the interests of exporting countries and other countries of the world and ensuring stability in energy markets on this basis, as well as increasing Russia's role in the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, the largest forum of Muslim states. More active interaction with the Majority countries in the framework of universal forums does not lose its importance: the UN Security Council (primarily with China, a permanent member of the Council) and the Group of Twenty, half of whose members represent the World majority.
In terms of values, Russian policy towards the countries of the World Majority is focused on promoting the liberation of countries from neocolonial dependence (Russia has a unique advantage here as a power that did not have colonies at all); respect for the socio–cultural identity of all countries and peoples (Russia itself is an example of peaceful cohabitation and cooperation of many ethnic groups, cultures and religions within a unique civilization), respect for the sovereignty of states and their national interests (Russia is a global champion of sovereignty and defending national interests; the task of its foreign policy is to find a balance of interests of the parties), equality of states, justice, solidarity and mutual assistance, respect for the traditions of peoples as the basis for the internal development of states, mutual benefit and openness.

Russian policy rejects any ideological confrontation, including artificially pedaled by the West along the line of "democracy-authoritarianism", which the United States and its allies use as an instrument of domination, value and ideological disarmament of other states. Similarly, Russia rejects the concept of an order based on the "rules" established by the West, with the help of which Americans and Europeans, encroaching on the interests of other countries, are trying to replace the universal norms of international law. Instead, Russia is firmly committed to the principles of State sovereignty and world order based on universal norms and instruments of international law, the Westphalian Principles of Interstate Relations. The fact that the countries of the World majority adhere to the same approach creates a solid platform for joint actions in favor of a just world order, peaceful coexistence of all cultures and civilizations. An example of the latter is given by East Asia, which is not coincidentally the object of destabilization by the United States, which is trying to "pull apart" ASEAN as part of efforts to connect the countries of the region to the policy of containing China. Europe is the opposite pole of world politics, which prompts us to recall the West's intervention in the affairs of East Asian countries in the XIX century (this analogy also makes us recall the Anglo-Japanese agreement of 1902, which actually became an element of the preparation of the Russian-Japanese War).
Since the world of great civilizations is returning, the process of realizing ourselves as a civilizational state has been launched, efforts are required in terms of conceptual and practical foundations of foreign policy, the development of not only country strategies, but also strategies for interaction with emerging civilizational centers - East Asian, Indian, Islamic–Arab, Latin American and others to the extent that how they will be formed. As almost always in the history of mankind, spiritual values will mean no less than economic or military strength.

In the current crisis, de facto military conditions, when our survival is at stake, a strict hierarchy of our foreign policy interests with the appropriate discipline of its observance is necessary. Our partners should be, first of all, nation states, and among them priority should be given to friendly ones. Such an approach would be opposed by any supranational structures, for example, the European Commission, the WTO, etc. Unconditional priority should be given to Greater Eurasia, including the post–Soviet space, the Arctic, East and South Asia, followed by the Middle East, Africa and LAC, followed by international cooperation to counter global challenges and threats and, finally, the West with an advantage for those capitals that are ready to maintain contacts and cooperation with us.

All our foreign economic activity, including trade, investment and cooperation with friendly states, should be focused on the consistent internationalization of the ruble. At the same time, it is important to use all your resources, as well as to mobilize bilateral and multilateral cooperation. It was the absence of a strong ruble that was one of the sources of weakness and political and psychological inferiority of the Soviet Union. Without currency self-sufficiency, Russia will never have full sovereignty. The benchmark should be the marginalization of the dollar and the euro to currency zones, with their freeing up space for the ruble and other promising national currencies. All options should be involved here, including barter and clearing. It is this field that is becoming the main and defining one in the current geopolitical revolution.

There is a need for qualitatively more active promotion of cultural ties with non-Western countries and especially the Asian world, which often has first-class
literature, cinematography, attractive and not contradicting our basic values products of mass culture.

Russia's opportunities in the western direction will be severely limited in the foreseeable future, but they remain. In particular, Russia's resource potential – energy, grain, mineral fertilizers, metals and other goods – makes it possible to take sensitive retaliatory, and possibly proactive measures against the actions of the West in case of further escalation on its part, as well as to encourage pragmatic policies on the part of individual states.

Despite the severance of contacts with the governments of unfriendly states (with the exception of some emergency communication channels to prevent armed clashes or to stop the escalation of nuclear incidents), Russia still has a limited opportunity to interact with various political and social forces, business and scientific circles of these countries – especially those who think alternative to the liberal-globalist mainstream that still prevails. With a very likely change in the political situation in certain states, the importance of such ties may increase.

The new era of international relations is an era of the most serious and dangerous risks. The struggle with the West, which Russia is waging, is strategic for the West, and existential for our country. These risks are serious and must be taken into account, but Russia, while overcoming the past partial indecision, readiness to play by the rules created by others and follow the theories introduced from outside, has enough resources and opportunities to achieve its goals. This was already the case in the 1930s, and in the two post-war decades.

Naturally, where possible, it is necessary to conduct dialogues with potential partners in Western countries. The normalization process will begin with the gradual restoration of bilateral contacts with individual Western and Eastern European countries, and exclusively on a transactional basis. The West is historically glued together from several components, and these components of the collective West may well "return" to their regions when national interests demand it and when the geopolitical principle that unites them wears out. This could well be one of the guidelines of our policy in the western direction.
Over time, bilateral normalization with the United States will be possible on the basis of recognition of the equality of "strong sovereign states" (Vladimir Putin at the SPIEF 2022) – a formula that coincides with the vision of the world in Trump's National Security Strategy (December 2017).

In military-political relations with the United States and the West as a whole, we will have to proceed from a long period of high military danger. First of all, based on the internal dynamics of the development of Western societies and elites, they are increasingly coming to a standstill. They tried to cover him with a covid, now with an explosion of Russophobia. But the problems remain and are even rapidly escalating.

The Ukrainian crisis is no longer a foreign policy issue in its purest form, but a key problem of the national survival strategy, since we are challenged not only at the level of security, but also identity and history. This is a question of a civil war postponed in time, which requires a decisive and irreversible outcome of our war. Effective material guarantees will be needed to fulfill possible bilateral and multilateral obligations in connection with the future status of Ukraine, its military-political neutralization, demilitarization and denazification within the new internationally recognized borders. This is a complex crisis, and it requires a comprehensive and distinct solution, not freezing.

Ukraine is only part of our problem with the West, it's not about it, but about the fact that the Kiev regime has volunteered to become an instrument of the West's anti-Russian policy and make the country's "frontline" status a way of existence, that is, to remove geopolitical rent from permanent tension between the West and Russia. In principle, this role was played objectively and with the encouragement of London, Paris and Washington by Nazi Germany, which, however, had its own plans for the rest of Europe. But the essence of this did not change - otherwise there would have been no policy of appeasement, including the Munich agreement, and a Strange war. In addition, Kiev fits into a broader front being built on our western border: Warsaw declares the defeat of Russia, and "on the battlefield", as the meaning of its national existence, which should be shared by the entire European Union, where this is not
denied. Accordingly, everything should end where it began, namely on the issue of ensuring Russia's security in the western direction in the context of NATO expansion and the movement of the alliance's military infrastructure in the direction of Russia, while Russia has not carried out any strategic movement towards the Western bloc (an important aspect of the situation is that in the context of strategic relations between Russia and the United States the European members of NATO are Washington's strategic springboard in the immediate vicinity of our borders, and even in the conditions of the destruction by the American side of the entire architecture of arms control, including the INF Treaty, the CFE Treaty and the Open Skies Treaty). This was discussed in the draft documents submitted to Washington and NATO on December 15, 2021. Their basic provisions were immediately rejected by the West, and only after that Russia began its own, being forced to solve the problem of threats to its security unilaterally. Unfortunately, the UN mechanism, aimed at forcing the permanent members of the Security Council to negotiate among themselves, did not work either: the United States has long taken the problems of its strategic interests beyond the UN framework. In the West, they say that Russia, with its nuclear deterrent potential, has nothing to worry about for its security: is it not equivalent to calling for the use of nuclear weapons if deterrence does not work, as is the case now?

In this regard, Russia cannot be satisfied with the ideas promoted in the American expert community of imposing a negotiated settlement on Moscow on its own terms: a cease-fire according to the Korean version with non-recognition of Russia's new borders and, accordingly, discrimination against Russian citizens living in new regions of the country; Ukraine remains outside NATO, but the current regime remains and security is ensured on the basis of all the same militarization with the direct participation of the Western alliance; the sanctions regime is maintained with some indulgences that meet the interests of the West. That is, the problem of our security remains almost unchanged in the format with a simple statement of the fact that the Western blitzkrieg failed. Until next time, then? And nothing about the radical reform of the European security architecture, which is vicious in its
naticentricity. Since Kiev does not refuse territorial revenge, Kissinger believes that it is better to accept Ukraine into NATO – then it will not be able to independently make a decision on ways to restore its territorial integrity. Which sounds like mockery, considering that Kiev has already made and is making all its decisions with the direct participation of Western capitals, and without the Western policy of deterring Russia, Ukraine's reformatting into anti-Russia would not have happened. If we take analogies from history, then the Western terms of the settlement would mean, for example, peace with Nazi Germany after the failure of its blitzkrieg in the summer and autumn of 1941, so that it could better prepare for war with the USSR. Or peace with Napoleon, even without a formal treaty, after his expulsion from Russia: the threat to the whole of Europe, including England (then London understood this well!), would then have persisted, and only at the insistence of St. Petersburg, with the support of London, a new anti-Napoleonic coalition was created, which defeated France, which, in Talleyrand's words, refused the "personal conquests" of the emperor of all the French.

Western capitals will have to understand what an absurdity they are offering. If they are not ready for a direct conflict with Russia, then there was nothing to start this whole adventure with the Ukrainian crisis. And if the urge Russia to recognize its "defeat of the Soviet Union in the cold war", which Russia did not conduct, and (in the absence of any peace conferences and the peace treaties at its end) to accept the status of a defeated power, as it continues to make occupied Germany, then perhaps it would be logical for the West to accept his impending defeat of Ukraine (it was done as true reflecting the reality of the statement that if Kiev fails, it will "defeat on behalf of NATO"!) and to draw conclusions for their relations with Russia.

Moscow would only not object to holding a European peace conference, which never took place after 1989. If it had been carried out in due time, there would have been no Ukrainian crisis and the associated casualties and destruction, as well as the economic hardships of Western countries and their political destabilization caused by the sanctions boomerang. History proves that lasting peace in Europe can be ensured only on the basis of a full-fledged, fair settlement with the participation of
all players. This did not happen either after the First World War or after the Second (there is still no peace treaty with Germany, which hardly meets the interests of the Germans, and the German question remains on the European agenda), which led to the Cold War and the current situation. In the absence of such a settlement, Moscow will have to continue to solve its security problem unilaterally. The minimum requirements from the Russian side would mean a final settlement (and not a cease-fire or truce), including the military-political neutralization of Ukraine, its complete demilitarization and federalization, the change of the Nazi regime (after all, Zelensky, like Hitler, promised peace in Donbass at the elections), recognition of new borders, and finally, someone He must answer to his people and Europe for all the crimes committed by this regime, including criminal methods of its conduct and hatched plans of aggression against Russia.

Russia should also be given – perhaps in a mild version of the 1721 Treaty of Nishtadt with Sweden – a role in maintaining proper constitutional order in Ukraine as an essential guarantee of our security. Moreover, trust between Russia and the West is at zero after the seven-year experience of the Minsk agreements approved by the UN Security Council and the current indirect aggression against Russia. Its restoration will take years and a change of generations of Western elites who "burned all the bridges" in the diplomatic dialogue with Moscow. The fact that, according to S. Hersh, the anti-Russian policy of the Biden administration is pedaled by the "personal hatred of the Kremlin" of such figures as the president's national security adviser, J.D., will also encourage unilateral guarantees.

Sullivan and Deputy Secretary of State V. Nuland. What guarantees can we talk about if the foreign policy of a superpower becomes a field of personal diplomacy and the promotion of personal ambitions? As for the Russian side, a growing number of Western political scientists, including American ones, are trying to make Western elites aware that they are not dealing with the Kremlin, but with historical Russia, as it was and as it will always be. We just have to put up with this, as we put up with the civilizational difference from us of the West, parting with illusions about it, as the Catholic and Protestant sovereigns put up with each other after Westphal. That is why there is
classical diplomacy, all the canons of which the West has decided to discard, and in this it opposes not only Russia, but also the entire World majority, for many of whose countries, especially traumatized by the colonial past, along with the UN Charter and the entire body of international law, it represents the only guarantee of their sovereignty and independence.

The situation in the Ukrainian crisis, where Washington got bogged down and faced the prospect of a "war on two fronts", which it sought to avoid, is well characterized by the words of Walter Lipman in connection with the Vietnam war: "The root of his (President Johnson's) problems is in his pride, stubborn refusal to recognize the limits of his and his country's capabilities. Such pride precedes destruction, and the spirit of arrogance is its own downfall." It remains to add that Biden does not justify the trust of the elites, where there is a consensus on the need to confront China as the main challenge to American dominance. Getting bogged down in Ukraine disrupts this strategy, as well as another one – to contain Iran. Presumably, hence Washington's desire to "turn the page" in Ukraine at the expense of Russia and, possibly, the revelations of Hersh.

It is probably worth setting up the task of creating, after the resolution of the Ukrainian issue, a security and cooperation system based on the SCO with the involvement of countries such as China, India, Pakistan, Iran, Turkey and a number of others. That is, to immerse the problems of European security in a broader, Eurasian context. Recreating the Euro–security system in one form or another according to the "from Lisbon to Vladivostok" model is not feasible and counterproductive - you cannot enter the same stream twice. The long–term goal is the withdrawal of the United States from Europe, which is the western tip of Eurasia, where they have lingered too long. The Ukrainian crisis has revealed the exorbitant price of the American presence in European affairs.
VI. RUSSIA AND THE WORLD

In combination with the cultural and civilizational self-determination of the country, and without any claims to exclusivity – as "one of the sovereign centers of world development", the Concept touches on the theme of Russia's historical mission, formulating it in the most fundamental and applied terms as "a historically unique mission to maintain the global balance of power and build a multipolar international system, ensuring conditions for the peaceful, progressive development of mankind on the basis of a unifying and constructive agenda."

The mention of history is not accidental at all, in it we played a truly unique role in European and world politics. And it was very often constructive and irreplaceable, and it would not be a big exaggeration to say that with this contribution to the peace and security of the continent, we owed Europe a debt for having received positive things from it at various stages of its development. Let's put it this way: Europe invested in Russia and got paid for it in full. This was the case with the liberation of Europe from the tyranny of Napoleon, when many in Russia believed that it was enough to expel him beyond the Neman, and then let other European powers deal with him themselves without our participation. It would be short-sighted and not practical, since we would condemn ourselves to the constant expectation of another invasion of "two dozen languages" (as, by the way, after the summer of 2004, we were constantly preparing to repel Georgia's attack on South Ossetia, which happened in August 2008).

Any empire in the West, starting with the Roman One, ends up with external expansion, because "it is not interested in acting within the framework of the international system – it strives to be such a system itself" (as Kissinger wrote about it). The current American hegemony, which has absorbed all the colonial empires of Western countries and operates by neocolonial methods on behalf of the entire historical West, fully falls under this. Kissinger in his "Diplomacy" also wrote that a united Germany aspired to absolute security, which is possible only due to the lack of security for everyone else. We see the same thing on the example of the United
States today in the formula "security in the center is impossible without security on the periphery", which underlies American interventionism, including the military and other presence of Americans in Europe (and the periphery is the whole world). But security can be ensured on the basis of reaching agreements with other countries – a method that prevailed in international relations even during the Cold War.

In the First World War, the whole of Europe would have been under the German boot back in 1914, if the Russian army had not opened hostilities in East Prussia in August, without waiting for the completion of mobilization and at the cost of the death of two corps of Samsonov's army (the famous "August guns" by Barbara Tuckman, who thwarted the German Schlieffen plan). That is, the German Blitzkrieg in the West would not have happened in 1940, but already then. There is no need to talk about the victory over Hitler: the leaders of the allies talked about it a lot during the war and immediately after (the Fulton speech of W. Churchill "closed" the topic), another thing is that now their descendants are trying to silence this topic as part of the falsification of history to justify their anti-Russian policy. I will only quote the words of Churchill, who, after learning about Hitler's attack on the USSR, declared: "Now we are saved!"

The historical confirmation of the uniqueness of our mission is provided by the mentioned Awakening of Asia and decolonization. And this was at a time when Churchill, immediately after the war – for all his role in opposing the British to Hitler – being a convinced imperialist, spoke in the spirit that someone would rid us of this troublesome Mahatma Gandhi. It is no coincidence that Brzezinski wrote about the "political awakening" in the world, clearly referring to the exhaustion of neocolonialism, and the need for what is called expansion in philosophy, that is, an international role that would go beyond the narrow limits of self-serving interests not so much of America itself as of its ruling elites. After all, if you think about what ordinary Americans got from globalization? The stagnation of consumer demand, the loss of jobs, the destruction of the middle class, which Robert Kennedy Jr. is now talking about the need to revive as part of a new revolution, the polarization of sentiment in the country and inflation, if we take the consequences of the Ukrainian
adventure of the Democrats. Therefore, the role of Russia declares itself not only in interstate relations, but much more broadly, if, for example, we take the protection of traditional values, primarily family and even civil rights such as parental rights, which are encroached upon by the policy of propaganda and promotion of transgenderism in the United States under the Democrats.

It turns out that in the wake of globalization, American and European elites have become so cosmopolitan that they have lost the ability not only to take into account the interests of the conservative majority of the population of their own countries, but also to speak the same language with fellow citizens. He was replaced by the Orwellian "newspeak", which is also in use in international political science, where for more than a decade, with the help of various euphemisms, he has been covering up theses about the lack of alternative and eternity of "American leadership", about the identity of American interests with the interests of other countries and the world community as a whole.

Russian diplomacy consistently advocates the formation of a truly unifying positive agenda, whether in the regions or in global politics. This applies to almost all significant issues – from the fight against terrorism to climate change and the fight against pandemics. Here the Concept has absolute continuity. The only difference is that now we are not bound by a diplomatic policy towards the West and can call a spade a spade. We can say that in many international issues, the policy of the West, which promotes its interests, diverges from the interests of the vast majority of countries, primarily developing ones. As a result, due to the need for broad agreement or even consensus, many international platforms, including the UN, where the West exercises actual control over the apparatus and acts by twisting the hands of certain countries that, say, "sit" in Western-controlled monetary and financial institutions and development institutions and are therefore vulnerable to pressure, have lost their effectiveness.

Speaking in New York on April 24 as part of the Russian presidency of the Security Council, Sergey Lavrov said: "Today it is clear to everyone, although not everyone is talking about it out loud: it is not about Ukraine at all, but about how international
relations will continue to be built: through the formation of a stable consensus based on a balance of interests – or through aggressive and explosive promotion of hegemony… Multilateralism implies respect for the UN Charter in all the interconnectedness of its principles… The shameless attempts of Western states to subjugate the secretariats of the UN and other international organizations have become a threat to the multilateral system.”
The West is undermining the very foundations of the multilateral system. At a minimum, Western representatives reduce everything to the lowest common denominator, which does not encroach on their interests and gives practically nothing in terms of solving common tasks for the entire world community. A vivid example of this is the Middle East Quartet consisting of the United States, Russia, the European Union and the United Nations (who remembers about it now!), where only what suited Washington took place, and everything else was blocked, despite the fact that all other participants de facto legitimized this approach. The result is sad – the Arab-Israeli settlement has not moved from the dead point. And this is just one of the issues on the global agenda that needs to be formed from scratch, starting from the interests of most countries. Here Russia, with its vast diplomatic experience and the trust of this Majority, including those rooted in the history of our relations, could play an initiative role. There is no doubt that a way out of the current crisis in relations between the West and Russia, which has a global dimension, is unlikely to be possible without a new agenda of global politics and world development. This, in turn, will serve to renew the UN simultaneously with the reform of its Security Council. After all, just think, the former defeated powers (Germany and Japan) are applying for permanent Council seats when the West, Europe, the EU and the Anglo-Saxons are overrepresented in it and Asia, Africa, the Arab-Islamic world and Latin America are underrepresented or not represented at all!
Russia, being itself a part of the non-Western world, whose self-awareness was promoted by the policy of the West, could assist the self-organization of the IB countries in various spheres and on various issues, their joint work on an equal basis, without interference and pressure from outside. Such experience will have
transformational significance for all global forums and platforms. It is unlikely that the activities of the UN will remain the same, which will finally function as its founders, including President F.D. Roosevelt, intended.

Russia, in cooperation with partners in the region, primarily within the SCO, will have to bury the old geopolitics of Western origin, all these heartlands and rimlands. The creation on a truly inclusive basis, with a place for Europe, which is the western tip of our continent, of a Large Eurasian Partnership covering this Mackinder Heartland, will put an end to the geopolitical fuss, not at all harmless, around the future of our countries and control over this territory and its resources.

It is all the more natural for Russia to participate in collective leadership at the global and regional levels, because we have always advocated this in contacts with our Western partners. This was perceived as an invitation to the "seven", which eventually was transformed into the "eight", which existed until February 2014. This experience was a complete disappointment for both sides, since all discussions were reduced to attempts to persuade the Russian side to support collective decisions already agreed by Western participants without us. It was clear that it would not be possible to work on such a basis for a long time. It was also clear to a number of Western leaders that the sole leadership of the West is a relic of the past, since the search for effective responses to common challenges and threats that are of a cross-border nature is impossible without the participation of both leading non-Western countries, primarily China, India and Brazil, and a number of other countries that, due to their geography and other factors can sometimes play an irreplaceable role. They just need to be listened to and generally taken seriously, and not dictated to them, as was the case in reality. I think that the work of the Group of Twenty summits raises similar questions, especially now that there has been a de facto separation between its Western and non-Western members. But the experience of the first years after the Global Crisis of 2008 showed that it was difficult for Western elites to overcome the inertia of their established policy: as soon as they were convinced that they could solve their problems through "quantitative easing", and any economic shocks still force investors to "go to the dollar", then serious work on trade and other
economic and monetary-financial problems have essentially ceased. Instead, the West took the path of politicizing the work of the Group of Twenty, which was not originally envisaged at all. Here, as in other forums, the ball was ruled by the lowest common denominator, determined either by Washington alone or by the collective West, and regardless of the consequences for the rest of the world. Such methods of work have long since exhausted themselves, and we can only thank the Western capitals for the fact that their policy forced a reassessment of the situation by all other members of the world community.

It is obvious that the implementation of our mission in world affairs will not be a problem-free process: they will put pressure on our partners, put sticks in the wheels, carry out provocations designed to undermine Moscow's credibility, make it an outcast, including by sticking labels (declaring it a "state sponsor of terrorism", etc.). This has not passed until now and, presumably, will not pass further.

At the same time, the cultural and civilizational factor will be of key importance: respect for partners, the ability to listen to them and take into account their interests, due tact and attention in joint work, mutual assistance. The work of BRICS, SCO, EAEU, CSTO, ASEAN and other modern forums without Western participation is based on these principles. They are the future.

An extremely important role should be played by the active and offensive ideological positioning of Russia as a bastion of fundamental values, primarily family values, and traditional conservatism. The postulates of the Russian idea should be inclusive in relation to the multinational society of our country. It is important to create mechanisms for their permanent "dissolution" in competitive cultural products, including network ones. We must enter the world market of ideas with our unique civilizational product. It is important to actively position Russia not only as a country (then the USSR) that made an important contribution to the fight against colonialism, but also now setting one of the goals of its policy to overcome neocolonialism, institutions and regimes that gave the West the opportunity to continue to appropriate an unfair share of world GDP.
The West's withdrawal from sole control of global governance will be fraught with confrontational emissions. We must be ready for this. Another danger is from the field of biopolitics, to which Western elites are inclined, again due to their political philosophy and culture. This manifested itself in Protestant fanaticism, in the practice of colonialism, and in the form of fascism/Nazism. So, there is a threat that with the decline of the dollar, the refusal of money in general will be initiated. We can talk about a digital currency if it, combined with the introduction of a universal subsistence minimum, will mean a kind of "digital concentration camp", meaning that digital "wallets" will be personal in nature, have restrictions on use by time and geography. It sounds like a dystopia: it is nothing less than the restriction of freedom of movement and not only, in fact, the exclusion of unprivileged segments of the population from ordinary life and their transformation into minimal consumers. But with the coordinating role of the Basel Bank for International Settlements in the Central Bank of a number of countries, the problems of introducing a digital currency are being studied. It is not yet clear what they will do. The incentive for Western countries can be the innate concern of some of their elites about population growth, a problem that has worsened in the West in the wake of globalization. Neo-Malthusianism, eugenics and now transgenderism are moving in this direction.

In due time, in connection with the next anniversary of Friedrich Nietzsche, F. Fukuyama wrote that Western elites have not overcome the "denial of equality of human dignity." So this is all serious. And who better than Russia to stand in the way of such experiments on humanity. Isn't this what the West sees as our alienness, our danger, when they themselves are approaching a dangerous line, as evidenced, in particular, by the anti-capitalism of Western youth, associated with the inability of the elites to solve the problems of preserving the planet for future generations?

The field for our leadership can be truly wide, crossing the usual boundaries between socialism and capitalism, West and East. Universality and all-humanity guarantee that our mission in this world will be in demand as never before and will be realized. Even if we go back to the differences between Tolstoy and Dostoevsky, as interpreted by Spengler (he himself broke with the Nietzsche Foundation when the
Nazis came to power), Tolstoy, who never communicated with Dostoevsky, wrote to N. Strahov: "I have never seen this man and never had a direct relationship with him and suddenly, when he died, I realized that he was the closest, dearest, the person I needed." I will add that in Yasnaya Polyana, the "Brothers Karamazov" open in some place are striking.

Not everything is hopeless on the "western front". There are enough thinking people who are critical of the policies of their elites in general and their foreign policy in particular. The most prominent of them was probably George Kennan, who, as P. Beinart testifies, wrote to his nephew before his death on the eve of the Iraq war: "What is being done to our country today is certainly something from which we will never be able to restore it as you and I knew it". Like many of his generation, Beinart writes, he died "in political despair." Thus, we are not so far from many in the West and, therefore, we are not mistaken in our mission. Something is very seriously wrong on the other side. According to the American Christian philosopher R. Niebuhr, "anti-communism, combined with a complete conviction of one's own rightness, can be as messianic (and utopian) as communism." It turns out that the circle of Protestant fanaticism with its confidence in its own selectivity closed 400 years after the Mayflower pilgrims landed on the east coast of America? And this, it seems, among other things determines the scale and nature of the tasks facing Russian diplomacy.
THE CONCEPT OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION
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OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

I. GENERAL PROVISIONS

1. This Concept is a strategic planning document which provides a systemic vision of the national interests of the Russian Federation in the domain of foreign policy, basic principles, strategic goals, major objectives and priority areas of the Russian foreign policy.

2. The Concept is based on the Constitution of the Russian Federation, generally recognized principles and norms of international law, international treaties of the Russian Federation, federal laws, other statutes and regulations of the Russian Federation governing foreign policy activities of the federal authorities.

3. The Concept specifies certain provisions of the National Security Strategy of the Russian Federation and takes into account basic provisions of other strategic planning documents pertaining to international relations.

4. More than a thousand years of independent statehood, the cultural heritage of the preceding era, deep historical ties with the traditional European culture and other Eurasian cultures, and the ability to ensure harmonious coexistence of different peoples, ethnic, religious and linguistic groups on one common territory, which has been developed over many centuries, determine Russia's special position as a unique country-civilization and a vast Eurasian and Euro-Pacific power that brings together the Russian people and other peoples belonging to the cultural and civilizational community of the Russian world.

5. Russia's place in the world is determined by its significant resources in all areas of living, its status of a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council, participant in the leading intergovernmental organizations and associations, one of the two largest nuclear powers, and the successor (continuing legal personality) of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR). Russia, taking into account its decisive contribution to the victory in World War II and its active role in
shaping the contemporary system of international relations and eliminating the
global system of colonialism, is one of the sovereign centres of global development
performing a historically unique mission aimed at maintaining global balance of
power and building a multipolar international system, as well as ensuring conditions
for the peaceful progressive development of humanity on the basis of a unifying and
constructive agenda.

6. Russia pursues an independent and multi-vector foreign policy driven by
its national interests and the awareness of its special responsibility for maintaining
peace and security at the global and regional levels. Russian foreign policy is
peaceful, open, predictable, consistent, and pragmatic and is based on the respect for
universally recognized principles and norms of international law and the desire for
equitable international cooperation in order to solve common problems and promote
common interests. Russia's attitude towards other states and interstate associations
is contingent on the constructive, neutral or unfriendly character of their policies
with respect to the Russian Federation.

II. TODAY'S WORLD: MAJOR TRENDS AND PROSPECTS FOR DEVELOPMENT

7. Humanity is currently going through revolutionary changes. The formation
of a more equitable multipolar world order is underway. The imbalanced model of
world development which has for centuries ensured the advanced economic growth
of colonial powers through the appropriation of resources of dependent territories
and states in Asia, Africa and in the Occident is irrevocably fading into the past. The
sovereignty and competitive opportunities of non-Western world powers and
regional leading countries are being strengthened. Structural transformation of the
world economy, its transfer to a new technological basis (including the introduction
of artificial intelligence technologies, the latest information and communication,
energy, biological technologies and nanotechnologies), the growth of national
consciousness, cultural and civilizational diversity and other objective factors
accelerate the process of shifting the development potential to new centres of
economic growth and geopolitical influence and promote the democratization of
international relations.
8. The changes which are now taking place and which are generally favourable are nonetheless not welcomed by a number of states being used to the logic of global dominance and neocolonialism. These countries refuse to recognize the realities of a multipolar world and to agree on the parameters and principles of the world order accordingly. Attempts are made to restrain the natural course of history, to eliminate competitors in the politico-military and economic spheres, and to suppress dissent. A wide range of illegal instruments and methods is being used, including the introduction of coercive measures (sanctions) in circumvention of the UN Security Council, provocation of coups d'état and military conflicts, threats, blackmailing, manipulation of the consciousness of certain social groups and entire nations, offensive and subversive actions in the information space. A wide-spread form of interference in the internal affairs of sovereign states has become the imposition of destructive neoliberal ideological attitudes that run counter to traditional spiritual and moral values. As a result, the destructive effect extends to all spheres of international relations.

9. Serious pressure is being put on the UN and other multilateral institutions the intended purpose of which, as platforms for harmonizing the interests of the leading powers, is artificially devalued. The international legal system is put to the test: a small group of states is trying to replace it with the concept of a rules-based world order (imposition of rules, standards and norms that have been developed without equitable participation of all interested states). It becomes more difficult to develop collective responses to transnational challenges and threats, such as the illicit arms trade, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, dangerous pathogens and infectious diseases, the use of information and communication technologies for illicit purposes, international terrorism, illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs, psychotropic substances and their precursors, transnational organized crime and corruption, natural and man-made disasters, illegal migration, environmental degradation. The culture of dialogue in international affairs is degrading, and the effectiveness of diplomacy as a means of
peaceful dispute settlement is decreasing. There is an acute lack of trust and predictability in international affairs.

10. The crisis of economic globalization is deepening. Current problems, including in the energy market and in the financial sector, are caused by degradation of many previous development models and instruments, irresponsible macroeconomic solutions (including uncontrolled emission and accumulation of unsecured debts), illegal unilateral restrictive measures and unfair competition. The abuse by certain states of their dominant position in some spheres intensifies the processes of fragmentation of the global economy and increases disparity in the development of states. New national and trans-border payment systems are becoming widespread, there is a growing interest in new international reserve currencies, and prerequisites for diversifying international economic cooperation mechanisms are being created.

11. The role of the power factor in international relations is increasing, conflict areas are expanding in a number of strategically important regions. Destabilizing build-up and modernization of offensive military capabilities and the destruction of the arms control treaty system are undermining strategic stability. The use of military force in violation of international law, the exploration of outer space and information space as new spheres of military action, the blurring of the line between military and non-military means of inter-state confrontation, and the escalation of protracted armed conflicts in a number of regions increase the threat to global security, enhance the risk of collision between major states, including with the participation of nuclear powers, and the probability of such conflicts escalating and growing into a local, regional or global war.

12. A logical response to the crisis of the world order is the strengthening of cooperation between the states that are subject to external pressure. The formation of regional and trans-regional mechanisms of economic integration and interaction in various spheres and the creation of multi-format partnerships to solve common problems are being intensified. Other steps (including unilateral ones) are also being taken to protect the vital national interests. High level of interdependences, global
reach and transnational nature of challenges and threats limit the ability of individual states, military-political and trade and economic alliances to ensure security, stability and prosperity. Effective solutions to the numerous problems of our time and peaceful progressive development of large and small nations and humanity as a whole can be achieved only through combining the potential of good faith efforts of the entire international community on the basis of the balance of power and interests.

13. Considering the strengthening of Russia as one of the leading centres of development in the modern world and its independent foreign policy as a threat to Western hegemony, the United States of America (USA) and their satellites used the measures taken by the Russian Federation as regards Ukraine to protect its vital interests as a pretext to aggravate the longstanding anti-Russian policy and unleashed a new type of hybrid war. It is aimed at weakening Russia in every possible way, including at undermining its constructive civilizational role, power, economic and technological capabilities, limiting its sovereignty in foreign and domestic policy, violating its territorial integrity. This Western policy has become comprehensive and is now enshrined at the doctrinal level. This was not the choice of the Russian Federation. Russia does not consider itself to be an enemy of the West, is not isolating itself from the West and has no hostile intentions with regard to it; Russia hopes that in future the states belonging to the Western community will realize that their policy of confrontation and hegemonic ambitions lack prospects, will take into account the complex realities of a multipolar world and will resume pragmatic cooperation with Russia being guided by the principles of sovereign equality and respect for each other's interests. The Russian Federation is ready for dialogue and cooperation on such a basis.

14. In response to unfriendly actions of the West, Russia intends to defend its right to existence and freedom of development using all means available. The Russian Federation will concentrate its creative energy on the geographic vectors of its foreign policy which have obvious prospects in terms of expanding mutually beneficial international cooperation. The majority of humanity is interested in having constructive relations with Russia and in strengthening Russia's positions on
the international scene as an influential global power making a decisive contribution to maintaining global security and ensuring peaceful development of states. This opens up a wide range of opportunities for the successful activity of the Russian Federation on the international scene.

III. NATIONAL INTERESTS OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION IN THE FOREIGN POLICY DOMAIN, STRATEGIC GOALS AND KEY TASKS SET BY THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

15. In view of the long-term trends in the world development, the national interests of the Russian Federation in the foreign policy domain are as follows:

1) to protect the constitutional system, sovereignty, independence, state and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation against any destructive external influence;

2) to maintain strategic stability, strengthen international peace and security;

3) to strengthen the legal foundations of international relations;

4) to protect the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of Russian citizens, and to protect Russian entities against foreign illegal encroachment;

5) to develop safe information space, protect Russian society against destructive informational and psychological influence;

6) to preserve the Russian nation, build human capital, and improve the quality of life and well-being of citizens;

7) to promote sustainable development of Russian economy on a new technological basis;

8) to promote traditional Russian moral and spiritual values, preserve cultural and historical heritage of the multi-ethnic people of the Russian Federation;

9) to ensure environmental protection, conservation of natural resources and environmental management, and adapt to climate change.

16. Building on its national interests and strategic national priorities, the Russian Federation focuses its foreign policy activities on achieving the following goals:
1) to ensure security of the Russian Federation, its sovereignty in all domains, and territorial integrity;

2) to create favourable external environment for sustainable development of Russia;

3) to consolidate Russia's position as one of the responsible, powerful and independent centres of the modern world.

17. Strategic foreign policy goals of the Russian Federation are achieved through performing the following main tasks:

1) to shape an equitable and sustainable world order;

2) to maintain international peace and security, strategic stability, ensure peaceful coexistence and progressive development of states and peoples;

3) to assist in developing effective comprehensive responses by the international community to common challenges and threats, including regional conflicts and crises;

4) to promote mutually beneficial and equal cooperation with all foreign states and their associations adopting a constructive stance, and mainstream Russian interests through mechanisms of multilateral diplomacy;

5) to counter anti-Russian activities carried out by foreign states and their associations, and create conditions conducive to stopping such activities;

6) to establish good neighbourly relations with contiguous states, and contribute to the prevention and elimination of tensions and conflicts in their territories;

7) to provide assistance to Russian allies and partners in promoting shared interests, ensuring their security and sustainable development, irrespective of whether or not the allies and partners receive international recognition or membership of international organizations;

8) to unlock and strengthen the capacity of multilateral regional associations and integration structures with Russia's participation;
9) to consolidate Russia's position in the world economy, achieve national development goals for the Russian Federation, ensure economic security, and realize its economic potential;

10) to ensure Russia's interests in the world's oceans, space and airspace;

11) to ensure that Russia is perceived abroad objectively, consolidate its position in the international information space;

12) to enhance Russia's role in the global humanitarian space, consolidate the position of the Russian language in the world, and contribute to the preservation abroad of historical truth and the memory of Russia's role in world history;

13) to protect abroad, in a comprehensive and effective way, the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and entities;

14) to develop ties with compatriots living abroad and render them full support in exercising their rights, ensuring protection of their interests and preserving all-Russian cultural identity.

IV. FOREIGN POLICY PRIORITIES OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

ESTABLISHMENT OF AN EQUITABLE AND SUSTAINABLE WORLD ORDER

18. Russia is striving towards a system of international relations that would guarantee reliable security, preservation of its cultural and civilizational identity, and equal opportunities for the development for all states, regardless of their geographical location, size of territory, demographic, resource and military capacity, or political, economic and social structure. In order to meet these criteria, the system of international relations should be multipolar and based on the following principles:

1) sovereign equality of states, respect for their right to choose models of development, and social, political and economic order;

2) rejection of hegemony in international affairs;

3) cooperation based on a balance of interests and mutual benefit;

4) non-interference in internal affairs;

5) rule of international law in regulating international relations, with all states abandoning the policy of double standards;

6) indivisibility of security in global and regional aspects;
7) diversity of cultures, civilizations and models of social organization, non-imposition on other countries by all states of their models of development, ideology and values, and reliance on a spiritual and moral guideline that is common for all world traditional religions and secular ethical systems;

8) responsible leadership on the part of leading nations aimed at ensuring stable and favourable conditions of development, both for themselves and for all other countries and peoples;

9) the primary role of sovereign states in decision-making regarding the maintenance of international peace and security.

19. In order to help adapt the world order to the realities of a multipolar world, the Russian Federation intends to make it a priority to:

1) eliminate the vestiges of domination by the US and other unfriendly states in global affairs, create conditions to enable any state to renounce neo-colonial or hegemonic ambitions;

2) improve international mechanisms for ensuring security and development at the global and regional levels;

3) restore the UN's role as the central coordinating mechanism in reconciling the interests of UN Member States and their actions in pursuit of the goals of the UN Charter;

4) enhance the capacity and international role of the interstate association of BRICS, the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), the RIC (Russia, India, China) and other interstate associations and international organizations, as well as mechanisms with strong Russian participation;

5) support regional and sub-regional integration within friendly multilateral institutions, dialogue platforms and regional associations in Asia Pacific, Latin America, Africa and the Middle East;

6) enhance sustainability and progressive development of the international legal system;
7) ensure equitable access for all states to the benefits of the global economy and division of labour at the international level, as well as to modern technology in the interest of fair and even development (including addressing global energy and food security);

8) intensify cooperation in all areas with Russia's allies and partners, and suppress the attempts by unfriendly states to obstruct such cooperation;

9) consolidate international efforts to ensure respect for and protection of universal and traditional spiritual and moral values (including ethical norms common to all world religions), and counter the attempts to impose pseudo-humanistic or other neo-liberal ideological views, leading to the loss by the humankind of traditional spiritual and moral values and integrity;

10) promote constructive dialogue, partnerships, and cross-fertilization of various cultures, religions and civilizations.

**Rule of Law in International Relations**

20. Ensuring the rule of law in international relations serves as one of the foundations of a just and sustainable world order, maintenance of global stability, peaceful and fruitful cooperation between states and their associations, and a factor in easing international tensions and increasing the predictability of world development.

21. Russia consistently advocates strengthening the legal fundamentals of international relations, and faithfully complies with its international legal obligations. At the same time, decisions of interstate bodies adopted on the basis of provisions of international treaties of the Russian Federation which collide with the Constitution may not be executed in the Russian Federation.

22. The mechanism for shaping universal international legal standards should be based on the free will of sovereign states, and the UN should remain the main venue for progressive development and codification of international law. Further promotion of the concept of a rules-based world order is fraught with the destruction of the international legal system and other dangerous consequences for humanity.
23. In the interests of increasing sustainability of the international legal system, preventing its fragmentation or decay, and avoiding indiscriminate use of generally recognized norms of international law, the Russian Federation intends to make it a priority to:

1) counter the attempts to replace, revise or interpret in an arbitrary way the principles of international law enshrined in the UN Charter and Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, as of 24 October 1970;

2) progressively develop, including given the realities of a multipolar world, and codify international law, primarily within the efforts taken under the aegis of the United Nations, as well as ensure participation of the maximum possible number of states in the UN international treaties, and universal interpretation and application thereof;

3) consolidate the efforts taken by states that advocate restoration of universal respect for international law and enhancement of its role as the basis of international relations;

4) exclude from international relations the practice of taking illegal unilateral coercive measures in violation of the UN Charter;

5) improve the mechanism for applying international sanctions, based on the exclusive competence of the UN Security Council to impose such measures and the need to ensure their effectiveness in maintaining international peace and security and preventing a deterioration of the humanitarian situation;

6) step up the process of international and legal formulation of the state border of the Russian Federation and its maritime boundaries, within which it exercises its sovereign rights and jurisdiction, based on the necessity of providing unconditional support for its national interests, and importance to strengthen good neighbourly relations, confidence and cooperation with contiguous states.

**Strengthening international peace and security**
24. The Russian Federation proceeds from the indivisibility of international security (in global and regional aspects) and seeks to ensure it equally for all states on the basis of the principle of reciprocity. On this basis, Russia is open to joint actions together with all interested states and interstate associations to shape a renewed, more stable international security architecture. In order to maintain and strengthen international peace and security, the Russian Federation intends to give priority attention to:

1) using peaceful means, primarily diplomacy, negotiations, consultations, mediation and good offices, to resolve international disputes and conflicts, settle them on the basis of mutual respect, compromises and a balance of legitimate interests;

2) establishing broad cooperation in order to neutralize the attempts by any states and interstate associations to seek global dominance in the military sphere, project their power beyond their area of responsibility, assume primary responsibility for maintaining international peace and security, draw dividing lines and ensure the security of some states to the detriment of legitimate interests of other countries. Such attempts are incompatible with the spirit, purposes and principles of the UN Charter and pose a threat of regional conflicts and a world war to the present and future generations;

3) building up political and diplomatic efforts aimed at preventing the use of military force in violation of the UN Charter, primarily attempts to bypass the prerogatives of the UN Security Council and violate the conditions of use of the inalienable right to self-defense guaranteed by Article 51 of the UN Charter;

4) adopting political and diplomatic measures to counter interference with the internal affairs of sovereign states, primarily aimed at complicating the domestic political situation, unconstitutional regime change or violation of the territorial integrity of states;

5) ensuring strategic stability, eliminating the prerequisites for unleashing a global war, risks of using nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, shaping a renewed international security architecture, preventing and resolving
international and internal armed conflicts, addressing transnational challenges and threats in certain areas of international security.

25. The Russian Federation proceeds from the premise that its Armed Forces can be used in accordance with the generally recognized principles and norms of international law, international treaties of the Russian Federation and legislation of the Russian Federation. Russia considers Article 51 of the UN Charter as an adequate and not to be revised legal basis for the use of force in self-defence. The use of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation can address, in particular, the tasks of repelling and preventing an armed attack on Russia and (or) its allies, resolving crises, maintaining (restoring) peace as commissioned by the UN Security Council or other collective security structures with the participation of Russia in their area of responsibility, protecting their citizens abroad, combating international terrorism and piracy.

26. In the event of unfriendly acts by foreign states or their associations threatening the sovereignty and territorial integrity of the Russian Federation, including those involving restrictive measures (sanctions) of a political or economic nature or the use of modern information and communication technologies, the Russian Federation considers it lawful to take the symmetrical and asymmetrical measures necessary to suppress such unfriendly acts and also to prevent them from recurring in future.

27. In order to ensure strategic stability, eliminate the prerequisites for unleashing a global war and risks of using nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction, and shaping a renewed international security architecture, the Russian Federation intends to give priority attention to:

1) strategic deterrence, preventing the aggravation of interstate relations to a level capable of provoking military conflicts, including with the use of nuclear and other types of weapons of mass destruction;

2) strengthening and developing the system of international treaties in the areas of strategic stability, arms control, prevention of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, their means of delivery, and related goods and technologies
(also mindful of the risk of such weapons' components falling into the hands of non-state actors);

3) strengthening and developing international political foundations (arrangements) for maintaining strategic stability, regimes of arms control and non-proliferation of all types of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, with mandatory comprehensive and coherent consideration of all types of weapons and factors affecting strategic stability;

4) preventing an arms race and precluding its transfer to new environments, creating conditions for further phased reduction of nuclear potentials, taking into account all the factors affecting strategic stability;

5) increasing predictability in international relations, implementing and, as necessary, improving confidence-building measures in the military and international spheres, and preventing unintentional armed incidents;

6) implementing security guarantees in respect of states parties to regional treaties on nuclear-weapon-free zones;

7) conventional arms control, combating illicit small arms and light weapons traffic;

8) strengthening nuclear safety and security at the global level and preventing acts of nuclear terrorism;

9) developing cooperation in the field of the peaceful uses of atomic energy to meet the needs of all interested states in fuel and energy, taking into account the right of each state to independently determine its national policy in this area;

10) strengthening the role of multilateral export control mechanisms in the areas of ensuring international security and non-proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their means of delivery, opposing transformation of these mechanisms into a tool of unilateral restrictions that impede the implementation of legitimate international cooperation.

28. In order to strengthen regional security, prevent local and regional wars, and settle internal armed conflicts (primarily on the territories of neighbouring states), the Russian Federation intends to give priority attention to:
1) adopting political and diplomatic measures to prevent emerging threats or reduce the level of threats to Russia's security from neighbouring territories and states;
2) supporting allies and partners in ensuring defence and security, suppressing attempts of external interference with their internal affairs;
3) developing military, military-political and military-technical cooperation with allies and partners;
4) assistance in the creation and improvement of mechanisms for ensuring regional security and settling crises in regions important to Russia's interests;
5) Russia's enhanced role in peacekeeping activities (including within cooperation with the UN, regional international organizations and parties to conflicts), strengthened peacekeeping and anti-crisis potential of the UN and the CSTO.

29. In order to prevent the rise of biological threats and ensure biological safety, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to:
1) investigating cases of alleged development, deployment and use of biological and toxin weapons, primarily in the territories of neighbouring states;
2) preventing terrorist acts and (or) sabotage committed with the use of dangerous pathogens and mitigation of consequences of such acts and (or) sabotage;
3) enhancing cooperation with allies and partners in the field of biological security, primarily with the CSTO and CIS member states.

30. In order to ensure international information security, counter threats against it, and strengthen Russian sovereignty in the global cyberspace, the Russian Federation intends to give priority attention to:
1) strengthening and improving the international legal regime for preventing and resolving interstate conflicts and regulating activities in the global cyberspace;
2) shaping and improving an international legal framework for countering criminal uses of information and communication technologies;
3) ensuring the safe and stable Internet operation and development based on the equitable participation of states in the management of this network and precluding foreign control over its national segments;

4) adopting political, diplomatic and other measures aimed at countering the policy of unfriendly states to weaponize the global cyberspace, use information and communication technologies to interfere with the internal affairs of states for military purposes, as well as limit the access of other states to advanced information and communication technologies and increase their technological dependence.

31. In order to eradicate international terrorism and protect the state and Russian citizens from terrorist acts, the Russian Federation intends to give priority attention to:

1) increased efficiency and coordination of multilateral cooperation in the anti-terrorist field, including within the UN framework;

2) strengthening the decisive role of states and their competent authorities in the fight against terrorism and extremism;

3) adopting political, diplomatic and other measures aimed at countering the use by states of terrorist and extremist (including neo-Nazi) organizations as a foreign and domestic policy tool;

4) combating the spread of terrorist and extremist ideology (including neo-Nazism and radical nationalism), in particular on the Internet;

5) identifying individuals and organizations involved in terrorist activities and suppressing channels for terrorist financing;

6) identifying and eliminating international legal regulation gaps related to cooperation in the field of anti-terrorism, in particular taking into account the risks of terrorist attacks with the use of chemical biological agents;

7) enhancing multifaceted cooperation with allies and partners in the field of anti-terrorism, providing them with practical assistance in counter-terrorism operations, including for the protection of Christians in the Middle East.

32. For the purpose of combatting the illicit traffic in, and consumption of narcotic drugs and psychotropic substances that pose a serious threat to the
international and national security, citizens' health and moral and spiritual foundations of the Russian society, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to:

1) enhancing the international cooperation with a view of avoiding the weakening or revision of the current global drug control regime (including the legalization thereof for non-medical purposes) as well as counteracting other initiatives that may entail the increase in the illicit drug trafficking and consumption;

2) rendering practical assistance to the allies and partners in carrying out anti-drug activities.

33. For the purpose of combating the transnational organized crime and corruption that cause a growing threat to the security and sustainable development of Russia, its allies and partners, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to enhancing the international cooperation with the goal of eliminating the safe havens for criminals and strengthening multilateral mechanisms that accord with the national interests of Russia.

34. For the purpose of reducing, in the territory of the Russian Federation, the risks that arise from the natural and man-made disasters occurring beyond it and enhancing the robustness of foreign countries against them, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to:

1) strengthening the organizational and legal framework and improving the mechanisms for bilateral and multilateral interaction in the area of the protection of population from natural and man-made emergencies, building capacity for early warning and forecasting of such emergencies, and overcoming their consequences;

2) providing the practical assistance to foreign states in the area of protection from natural and man-made emergencies, including the use of unique Russian technologies and experience in emergency response.

35. For the purpose of combating the illegal migration and improving the international migrations regulation, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to strengthening the interaction in this area with the CIS member states that pursue a constructive policy towards the Russian Federation.
Ensuring the interests of the Russian Federation in the World Ocean, outer space and airspace

36. For the purpose of studying, exploring and using the World Ocean with a view of ensuring the security and development of Russia, counteracting unilateral restrictive measures on behalf of the unfriendly states and their associations towards Russian marine activities, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to:

1) ensuring a secure free, safe and comprehensive access of Russia to vital, essential and other environments, transport communications and resources of the World Ocean;

2) responsible and efficient exploration of biological, mineral, energy and other resources of the World Ocean, development of marine pipeline systems, conduct of scientific research, protection and preservation of the marine environment;

3) consolidating on the external borders of the continental shelf of the Russian Federation in accordance with the international law and protecting its sovereign rights on the continental shelf.

37. For the purpose of peaceful study and uses of outer space, consolidation of its leadership positions on the space goods, works and services markets, reinforcement of its status as one of the leading space powers, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to:

1) promoting the international cooperation with a view of preventing an arms race in outer space, primarily by developing and concluding a relevant international treaty, and, as an intermediary step, by all states parties undertaking not to be the first to place weapons in outer space;

2) geographic diversification of the international cooperation in the sphere of outer space.

38. For the purpose of using the international airspace in the interests of the security and development of Russia, counteracting the unilateral restrictive measures on behalf of the unfriendly countries and their associations towards Russian aircraft, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to:
1) ensuring a secure access of Russia to the international (open) airspace taking into account the principle of freedom of flights;

2) geographic diversification of the international flight routes for the Russian aircraft and development of cooperation in the sphere of aerial transportation, protection and use of airspace with the states that pursue a constructive policy towards Russia.

**International economic cooperation and support of international development**

39. For the purpose of ensuring the economic security, economic sovereignty, sustainable economic growth, structural and technological renewal, improving the international competitiveness of the national economy, preserving the leading positions of Russia in the world economy, reducing risks and capturing opportunities arising from the deep changes in the world economy and international relations as well as based on unfriendly actions by foreign states and their associations, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to:

1) accommodating the world trade and monetary and financial systems taking into account the realities of the multipolar world and consequences of the crisis of economic globalization, first and foremost with a view of narrowing the possibilities for the unfriendly states to excessively use their monopolistic or dominant stand in certain spheres of the world economy, and enhancing the participation of the developing countries in the global economic management;

2) reducing the dependence of the Russian economy on the unfriendly actions of foreign states, primarily by developing a de-politicized, safe, independent from the unfriendly states international payment infrastructure and enlarging the use of national currencies in payments with the allies and partners;

3) enhancing the Russian presence on the world markets, increasing the non-resource based, non-energy export; to the geographic diversification of economic ties in order to re-direct them to the states that pursue a constructive and neutral policy towards the Russian Federation, while remaining to be open to the pragmatic cooperation with the business circles of the unfriendly states;
4) improving the conditions for Russia to access the world markets; protecting the Russian organizations, investments, goods and services beyond the country from discrimination, unfair competition, attempts of the foreign states to unilaterally regulate the world markets that are key for the Russian export;

5) protecting the Russian economy and international trade and economic ties from unfriendly actions of foreign states by applying special economic measures in response to such actions;

6) facilitating the attraction to Russia of foreign investments, advance knowledge and technologies and high-quality specialists;

7) promoting the processes of regional and interregional economic integration that serve Russia's interests, first of all, within the Union State, EAEU, CIS, SCO, BRICS as well as with a view of shaping the Greater Eurasian Partnership;

8) capitalizing on the unique geographical position and transit capacity of Russia to advance the national economy and strengthen the transport and infrastructure connectivity in Eurasia.

40. For the purpose of enhancing the robustness of the system of international relations against crises, improving the social and economic as well as humanitarian situations in the world, relieving the consequences of the military conflicts, implementing the 2030 Sustainable Development Agenda, promoting a positive attitude toward Russia in the world, the Russian Federation intends to promote the international development while giving priority to the social and economic development of the Republic of Abkhazia, the Republic of South Ossetia, EAEU member states, CIS member states that support good-neighbour relations with Russia as well as developing states that pursue a constructive policy towards the Russian Federation.

Environmental protection and global health

41. For the purpose of preserving the favourable environment, improving of its quality, and intelligently adapt Russia to the climate changes in the interests of modern and future generations, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to:
1) promoting the scientifically sound, non-politicized international efforts to limit the negative impacts on the environment (including greenhouse gas emission reduction), maintaining and enhancing the absorbent capabilities of ecosystems;

2) expanding cooperation with the allies and partners with a view to counteracting the politicization of the international nature-oriented and climate activity, primarily its implementation with a goal of unfair competition, interference in the internal affairs of states and limitation of the states' sovereignty in connection with their natural resources;

3) maintaining the right of every state to choose for itself the best suitable mechanisms and methods of environmental protection and adaptation to climate change;

4) facilitating the elaboration of uniform, understandable and global rules of environmental climate regulation taking into account the Paris Climate Agreement of 12 December 2015, adopted within the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change dated 9 May 1992;

5) increasing the efficiency of the international cooperation in the area of development and introduction of the state-of-the-art technologies that would enable the preservation of favourable environment and its improved quality as well as adaptation of the states to the climate change;

6) preventing the transborder damaging of the environment of the Russian Federation, primarily the transmission to its territory across its border of the contaminating agents (including radioactive substances), quarantine, highly hazardous and dangerous crop pests, anti-crop agents, undesirable plants and micro-agents.

42. For the purpose of protecting health and ensuring the social welfare of the people of Russia and other states, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to:

1) increasing efficiency of the international cooperation in the area of healthcare and preventing its politicization, including within international organizations;
2) consolidating international efforts in order to prevent the extension of dangerous infectious diseases, timely and efficiently respond to sanitary and epidemiological emergencies, combat chronic non-contagious diseases, overcome social and economic consequences of pandemics and epidemics;

3) increasing efficiency of international scientific research in healthcare, primarily aimed at developing and introducing new means of prevention, diagnostics and treatment of diseases.

**International humanitarian cooperation**

43. For the purpose of strengthening the role of Russia in the world humanitarian space, shaping a positive attitude thereto abroad, enhancing the positions of the Russian language in the world, counteracting the Russophobia campaign led by the unfriendly foreign states and their associations as well as enhancing mutual understanding and confidence among states, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to:

1) raising awareness and protecting against discrimination outside the country of the national developments in the sphere of culture, sciences and arts as well as strengthening the image of Russia as a state attractive for life, work, education and tourism;

2) promoting the Russian language and strengthening its status as a language of international communication, one of the official UN languages and of several other international organizations; promoting its learning and use abroad (primarily in the CIS member states); preserving and strengthening the role of the Russian language in inter-ethnic and inter-state communication, including within international organizations; protecting the Russian language from discrimination abroad;

3) developing mechanisms of public diplomacy with the participation of representatives and institutions of civil society with a constructive attitude towards Russia, as well as political scientists, representatives of the expert and scientific community, youth, volunteer, search and other social movements;
4) promoting the development of international relations between religious organizations belonging to Russia's traditional religions, and protecting the Russian Orthodox Church from discrimination abroad, including in the interests of ensuring the unity of Orthodoxy;

5) assisting in the creation of a single humanitarian space of the Russian Federation and the CIS member states, preserving centuries-old civilizational and spiritual ties between the people of Russia and the peoples of these states;

6) ensuring guaranteed free access for Russian athletes and sports organizations to international sports activities, facilitating their depoliticization, improving the work of international sports intergovernmental and public organizations, and developing new formats for international sports cooperation with states pursuing a constructive policy towards Russia.

44. With the purpose of countering the falsification of history, incitement of hatred against Russia, spread of the ideology of neo-Nazism, racial and national exclusivity, and aggressive nationalism, and strengthening the moral, legal and institutional foundations of contemporary international relations based primarily on the universally recognized outcomes of World War II, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to:

1) disseminating accurate information abroad about the role and place of Russia in world history and the formation of a just world order, including the decisive contribution of the Soviet Union to the victory over Nazi Germany and to the founding of the UN, its extensive assistance in decolonization and the formation of statehood of the peoples of Africa, Asia and Latin America;

2) taking both within relevant international platforms and at the level of bilateral relations with foreign partners the necessary measures to counteract the distortion of information about significant events in world history relating to Russian interests, including the suppression of crimes, the rehabilitation and glorification of German Nazis, Japanese militarists and their collaborators;
3) taking response measures against foreign states and their associations, foreign officials, organizations and citizens involved in committing unfriendly acts against Russian sites of historical and memorial significance located abroad;

4) promoting constructive international cooperation to preserve historical and cultural heritage.

**Protection of Russian citizens and organizations from foreign unlawful infringements, support for compatriots living abroad, international cooperation in the field of human rights**

45. With the view to protecting the rights, freedoms and lawful interests of Russian citizens (including minors), Russian organizations from foreign unlawful infringements, and countering the campaign of Russophobia unleashed by unfriendly states, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to:

1) monitoring of unfriendly actions against Russian citizens and organizations, such as the use of restrictive measures (sanctions) of a political or economic nature, unfounded legal prosecution, the commission of crimes, discrimination, incitement to hatred;

2) taking enforcement actions and special economic measures against foreign states and their associations, foreign officials, organizations and citizens involved in committing unfriendly acts against Russian citizens and organizations and in violating the fundamental rights and freedoms of compatriots living abroad;

3) enhancing the effectiveness of global, regional and bilateral mechanisms for the international protection of the rights, freedoms and legitimate interests of Russian citizens and the protection of Russian organizations, as well as developing new mechanisms in this area, where necessary.

46. With a view to developing ties with compatriots living abroad and providing them with comprehensive support (given their significant contribution to the preservation and dissemination of the Russian language and Russian culture) in connection with their systematic discrimination in several states, the Russian Federation, as the core of the civilizational community of the Russian world, intends to give priority to:
1) promoting the consolidation of compatriots living abroad who have a constructive attitude towards Russia and supporting them in protecting their rights and legitimate interests in their states of residence, primarily in hostile states, in preserving their all-Russian cultural and linguistic identity, Russian spiritual and moral values, and their ties with their historic Motherland;

2) assisting voluntary resettlement of compatriots who have a constructive attitude towards Russia, especially those who suffer discrimination in their states of residence, in the Russian Federation.

47. Russia recognizes and guarantees human and civil rights and freedoms in accordance with generally recognized principles and rules of international law, and considers the renunciation of hypocrisy and faithful implementation by states of their obligations in this area to be a condition for the progressive and harmonious development of mankind. With the purpose of promoting respect for and observance of human rights and freedoms in the world, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to:

1) ensuring that the interests of Russia and its national, social, cultural, spiritual, moral, and historical characteristics are taken into account when strengthening international legal regulations and international mechanisms in the area of human rights;

2) monitoring and making public the real situation regarding the observance of human rights and freedoms in the world, primarily in states claiming their exclusive position in human rights issues and in setting international standards in this area;

3) eradicating double standards policies in international human rights cooperation, and making it non-politicized, equitable and mutually respectful;

4) countering the use of human rights issues as a tool for external pressure, interference in the internal affairs of states and destructive influence on the activities of international organizations;
5) taking action against foreign states and their associations, foreign officials, organizations, and citizens involved in violations of fundamental human rights and freedoms.

**Information support for the foreign policy of the Russian Federation**

48. With the purpose of forming an objective perception of Russia abroad, strengthening its position in the global information space, countering the coordinated anti-Russian propaganda campaign carried out on a systematic basis by unfriendly states and involving disinformation, defamation and incitement to hatred, and ensuring free access of the population of foreign states to accurate information, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to:

1) making truthful information about the Russian Federation's foreign and domestic policies, its history and achievements in various spheres of life, and other accurate information about Russia available to the widest possible foreign audience;

2) facilitating the dissemination of information abroad to promote international peace and understanding, develop and establish friendly relations between states, strengthen traditional spiritual and moral values as a unifying principle for all mankind, and enhance Russia's role in the global humanitarian space;

3) ensuring protection from discrimination abroad and assisting in strengthening the position of Russian information and communications media, including domestic digital information platforms, in the global information space, as well as constructively-minded media of compatriots living abroad towards Russia;

4) improving the tools and methods of information support for the foreign policy activities of the Russian Federation, including more effective use of modern information and communication technologies, including social networks;

5) improving international mechanisms and norms of regulation and protection of information and communication media, for ensuring free access to them and creating and disseminating information;

6) creating an enabling environment for foreign media to operate in Russia on the basis of reciprocity;
7) the further formation of a common information space of the Russian Federation and the CIS member states, increasing cooperation in the information sphere by states pursuing a constructive policy towards Russia.

V. REGIONAL TRACKS OF THE FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

Near Abroad

49. The most important for the security, stability, territorial integrity and social and economic development of Russia, strengthening its position as one of the influential sovereign centres of world development and civilization is to ensure sustainable long-term good-neighbourly relations and to combine the strengths in various fields with the CIS member states, which are connected with Russia by centuries-old traditions of joint statehood, deep interdependence in various fields, a common language and close cultures. With the purpose of further transformation of the near abroad into a zone of peace, good neighbourliness, sustainable development and prosperity, the Russian Federation intends to give priority to:

1) preventing and resolving armed conflicts, improving inter-state relations, and ensuring stability in the near abroad, including preventing the instigation of "colour revolutions" and other attempts to interfere in the internal affairs of Russia's allies and partners;

2) ensuring guaranteed protection of Russia, its allies and partners under any military and political scenario in the world, strengthening the system of regional security based on the principle of indivisibility of security and Russia's key role in maintaining and strengthening regional security, the complementarity of the Union State, the CSTO and other formats of interaction between Russia and its allies and partners in the defence and security sphere;

3) countering deployment or reinforcement of military infrastructure of unfriendly states and other threats to Russia's security in the near abroad;

4) deepening integration processes, which serve Russia's interests, and strategic cooperation with the Republic of Belarus, strengthening the mutually beneficial comprehensive cooperation system based on combined CIS and EAEU
potentials, as well as developing additional multilateral formats, including a mechanism for interaction between Russia and the states of the Central Asian region;

5) establishing an integrated economic and political space in Eurasia in the long term;

6) preventing and countering unfriendly actions of foreign states and their alliances, which provoke disintegration processes in the near abroad and create obstacles to the exercise of the sovereign right of Russia's allies and partners to deepen their comprehensive cooperation with Russia;

7) unleashing the economic potential of good-neighbourliness, primarily with the EAEU member states and states interested in developing economic relations with Russia in order to form a broader integration contour in Eurasia;

8) comprehensively supporting the Republic of Abkhazia and the Republic of South Ossetia, promoting the voluntary choice, based on international law, of the peoples of these states in favor of a deeper integration with Russia;

9) strengthening cooperation in the Caspian Sea zone, proceeding from the premise that the solution of all issues relating to this region falls within the exclusive competence of the five Caspian states.

**The Arctic**

50. Russia is seeking to preserve peace and stability, enhance environmental sustainability, reduce threats to national security in the Arctic, create favourable international conditions for the social and economic development of the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation (including to protect the original habitat and traditional livelihood of the indigenous people living there), as well as to advance the Northern Sea Route as a competitive national transport corridor making possible its international use for transportations between Europe and Asia. In pursuing these aims, the Russian Federation is going to focus on:

1) peacefully resolving international issues, related to the Arctic, proceeding from the premise of the special responsibility of the Arctic states for the sustainable development of the region and the sufficiency of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea dated 10 December 1982 for regulating interstate relations in the
Arctic Ocean (including protecting the marine environment and delimitating maritime areas);

2) counteracting the unfriendly states' policy aimed at militarization of the region and limiting Russia's ability to exercise its sovereign rights in the Arctic zone of the Russian Federation;

3) ensuring the unalterability of the historically established international legal regime of the inland maritime waters of the Russian Federation;

4) establishing a mutually beneficial cooperation with the non Arctic states pursuing a constructive policy toward Russia and interested in international activities in the Arctic, including developing infrastructure of the Northern Sea Route.

Eurasian continent

The People's Republic of China, the Republic of India

51. A comprehensive deepening of ties and enhancement of coordination with friendly sovereign global centres of power and development, which are located on the Eurasian continent and committed to approaches which coincide in principle with the Russian approaches to a future world order and solutions for key problems of the world politics, is particularly important for achieving strategic goals and major objectives of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation.

52. Russia aims at further strengthening the comprehensive partnership and the strategic cooperation with the People's Republic of China and focuses on the development of a mutually beneficial cooperation in all areas, provision of mutual assistance, and enhancement of coordination in the international arena to ensure security, stability and sustainable development at the global and regional levels, both in Eurasia and in other parts of the world.

53. Russia will continue to build up a particularly privileged strategic partnership with the Republic of India with a view to enhance and expand cooperation in all areas on a mutually beneficial basis and place special emphasis on increasing the volume of bilateral trade, strengthening investment and technological
ties, and ensuring their resistance to destructive actions of unfriendly states and their alliances.

54. Russia seeks to transform Eurasia into a continental common space of peace, stability, mutual trust, development and prosperity. Achieving this goal implies:

1) comprehensive strengthening of the SCO's potential and role in ensuring security in Eurasia and promoting its sustainable development by enhancing the Organization's activities in the light of current geopolitical realities;

2) establishment of the broad Greater Eurasian Partnership integration contour by combining the potential of all the states, regional organizations and Eurasian associations, based on the EAEU, the SCO and the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) as well as the conjunction of the EAEU development plans and the Chinese initiative "One Belt One Road" while preserving the possibility for all the interested states and multilateral associations of the Eurasian continent to participate in this partnership and – as a result – establishment of a network of partner organizations in Eurasia;

3) strengthening of the economic and transport interconnectivity in Eurasia, including through the modernization and increased capacity of the Baikal-Amur Mainline and the Trans-Siberian railway; the rapid launch of the International North – South Transport Corridor; improvement of infrastructure of the Western Europe – Western China International Transit Corridor, the Caspian and the Black Sea regions, and the Northern Sea Route; creation of development zones and economic corridors in Eurasia, including the China – Mongolia – Russia economic corridor, as well as increased regional cooperation in digital development and establishment of an energy partnership.

4) comprehensive settlement in Afghanistan, assistance in building it as a sovereign, peaceful and neutral State with stable economy and political system which meets the interests of all the ethnic groups living there and opens up prospects for integrating Afghanistan into the Eurasian space for cooperation.

**The Asia-Pacific region**
55. Given the dynamically growing multifaceted potential of the Asia-Pacific region, the Russian Federation is going to focus on:

1) increasing economic, security, humanitarian and other cooperation with the states of the region and the ASEAN member states;

2) establishing a comprehensive, open, indivisible, transparent, multilateral and equitable architecture of security and mutually beneficial cooperation in the region based on a collective and non-aligned approaches as well as unleashing the region's potential aiming at the establishment of a Great Eurasian Partnership;

3) promoting constructive non-politicized dialog and interstate cooperation in various areas, including with the help of opportunities provided by the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation forum;

4) countering attempts to undermine the regional system of multilateral security and development alliances on the basis of ASEAN, which rests upon the principles of consensus and equality of its participants;

5) developing a broad international cooperation to counter policies aimed at drawing dividing lines in the region.

**The Islamic world**

56. The states of friendly Islamic civilization, which has great prospects for establishing itself as an independent centre of world development within a polycentric world, are increasingly in demand and more reliable partners of Russia in ensuring security and stability as well as in solving economic problems at the global and regional levels. Russia seeks to strengthen the comprehensive mutually beneficial cooperation with the Member States of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, respecting their social and political systems and traditional spiritual and moral values. In pursuing these aims, the Russian Federation is going to focus on:

1) developing the full-scale and trustful cooperation with the Islamic Republic of Iran, providing comprehensive support for the Syrian Arab Republic, and deepening the multifaceted mutually beneficial partnerships with the Republic of Turkey, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the Arab Republic of Egypt and the other
Member States of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, given the extent of their sovereignty and constructiveness of their policy toward the Russian Federation;

2) establishing a sustainable comprehensive regional security and cooperation architecture in the Middle East and North Africa, based on combining the capacities of all the states and interstate alliances of the regions, including the League of Arab States and the Gulf Cooperation Council. Russia intends to actively cooperate with all the interested states and interstate associations in order to implement the Russia's Collective Security Concept for the Persian Gulf Region, viewing the implementation of this initiative as an important step toward a sustainable and comprehensive normalization of the situation in the Middle East;

3) promoting interfaith and intercultural dialog and understanding, consolidating efforts to protect traditional spiritual and moral values, and combating Islamophobia, including via the Organization of Islamic Cooperation;

4) reconciling differences and normalizing relations among the Member States of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, as well as between these states and their neighbours (primarily the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Arab countries, the Syrian Arab Republic and its neighbours, the Arab countries and the State of Israel), including within the efforts aimed at a comprehensive and lasting solution to the Palestinian question;

5) helping resolve and overcome consequences of armed conflicts in the Middle East, North Africa, South, Southeast Asia and other regions where Member States of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation are located;

6) unleashing the economic potential of the Member States of the Organization of Islamic Cooperation with a view to establishing the Greater Eurasian Partnership.

Africa

57. Russia stands in solidarity with the African states in their desire for a more equitable polycentric world and elimination of social and economic inequality, which is growing due to the sophisticated neo-colonial policies of some developed states towards Africa. The Russian Federation intends to support further the
establishment of Africa as a distinctive and influential centre of world development, giving priority to:

1) supporting the sovereignty and independence of interested African states, including through security assistance, inter alia food and energy security, as well as military and military-technical cooperation;

2) assistance in resolving and overcoming the consequences of armed conflicts in Africa, especially inter-ethnic and ethnic ones, advocating the leading role of African states in these efforts, based on the principle "African problems – African solution";

3) strengthening and deepening Russian-African cooperation in various spheres on a bilateral and multilateral basis, primarily within the framework of the African Union and the Russia-Africa Partnership Forum;

4) increasing trade and investment with African states and African integration structures (primarily the African Continental Free Trade Area, the African Export-Import Bank and other leading subregional organizations), including through the EAEU;

5) promoting and developing links in the humanitarian sphere, including scientific cooperation, training of national personnel, strengthening health systems, providing other assistance, promoting intercultural dialogue, protecting traditional spiritual and moral values, and the right to freedom of religion.

**Latin America and the Caribbean**

58. Given the progressive strengthening of the sovereignty and multifaceted potential of Latin American and Caribbean states, the Russian Federation intends to develop relations with them on a pragmatic, de ideologized and mutually beneficial basis, giving priority attention to:

1) supporting interested Latin American states under pressure from the United States and its allies in securing sovereignty and independence, including through the promotion and expansion of security, military and military-technical cooperation;

2) strengthening friendship, mutual understanding and deepening multifaceted mutually beneficial partnership with the Federative Republic of Brazil,
the Republic of Cuba, the Republic of Nicaragua, the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, developing relations with other Latin American states, taking into account the degree of independence and constructiveness of their policy towards the Russian Federation;

3) increasing mutual trade and investment with Latin American and Caribbean States, including through cooperation with the Community of Latin American and Caribbean States, the Common Market of the South. The Central American Integration System, the Bolivarian Alliance for the Peoples of the Americas, the Pacific Alliance, and the Caribbean Community;

4) expanding cultural, scientific, educational, sports, tourism and other humanitarian ties with the states of the region.

**European region**

59. Most European states pursue an aggressive policy toward Russia aimed at creating threats to the security and sovereignty of the Russian Federation, gaining unilateral economic advantages, undermining domestic political stability and eroding traditional Russian spiritual and moral values, and creating obstacles to Russia's cooperation with allies and partners. In this connection, the Russian Federation intends to consistently defend its national interests by giving priority attention to:

1) reducing and neutralizing threats to security, territorial integrity, sovereignty, traditional spiritual and moral values, and socio-economic development of Russia, its allies and partners from unfriendly European states, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, the European Union and the Council of Europe;

2) creating conditions for the cessation of unfriendly actions by European states and their associations, for a complete rejection of the anti Russian course (including interference in Russia's internal affairs) by these states and their associations, and for their transition to a long-term policy of good-neighbourliness and mutually beneficial cooperation with Russia;

3) the formation of a new model of coexistence by European states to ensure the safe, sovereign and progressive development of Russia, its allies and partners,
and durable peace in the European part of Eurasia, taking into account the potential of multilateral formats, including the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe.

60. Objective prerequisites for the formation of a new model of coexistence with European states are geographical proximity, historically developed deep cultural, humanitarian and economic ties of the peoples and states of the European part of Eurasia. The main factor complicating the normalization of relations between Russia and European states is the strategic course of the USA and their individual allies to draw and deepen dividing lines in the European region in order to weaken and undermine the competitiveness of the economies of Russia and European states, as well as to limit the sovereignty of European states and ensure US global domination.

61. The realization by the states of Europe that there is no alternative to peaceful coexistence and mutually beneficial equal cooperation with Russia, an increase in the level of their foreign policy independence and a transition to a policy of good neighbourliness with the Russian Federation will have a positive effect on the security and welfare of the European region and help European states take their proper place in the Greater Eurasian Partnership and in a multipolar world.

**The U.S. and other Anglo-Saxon states**

62. Russia's course towards the U.S. has a combined character, taking into account the role of this state as one of the influential sovereign centres of world development and at the same time the main inspirer, organizer and executor of the aggressive anti-Russian policy of the collective West, the source of major risks to the security of the Russian Federation, international peace, a balanced, equitable and progressive development of humanity.

63. The Russian Federation is interested in maintaining strategic parity, peaceful coexistence with the United States, and the establishment of a balance of interests between Russia and the United States, taking into account their status as major nuclear powers and special responsibility for strategic stability and international security in general. The prospects of forming such a model of U.S.-
Russian relations depend on the extent to which the United States is ready to abandon its policy of power-domination and revise its anti-Russian course in favour of interaction with Russia on the basis of the principles of sovereign equality, mutual benefit, and respect for each other's interests.

64. The Russian Federation intends to build relations with other Anglo-Saxon states depending on the degree of their willingness to abandon their unfriendly course toward Russia and to respect its legitimate interests.

Antarctica

65. Russia is interested in preserving Antarctica as a demilitarized space of peace, stability and cooperation, maintaining environmental sustainability and expanding its presence in the region. For these purposes, the Russian Federation intends to give priority attention to preservation, effective implementation and progressive development of the Antarctic Treaty System of December 1, 1959.

VI. FORMATION AND IMPLEMENTATION OF FOREIGN POLICY OF THE RUSSIAN FEDERATION

66. The President of the Russian Federation, acting in accordance with the Constitution of the Russian Federation and federal laws, defines the main lines of the foreign policy, directs the county's foreign policy and, as the head of State, represents the Russian Federation in international relations.

67. The Council of the Federation of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation and the State Duma of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, within the scope of their authority, shape the legislative framework for the foreign policy and implementation of international obligations of the Russian Federation, as well as contribute to the fulfilment of the tasks of parliamentary diplomacy.

68. The Government of the Russian Federation takes measures to implement foreign policy and international cooperation.

69. The State Council of the Russian Federation participates in the development of strategic tasks and goals of the foreign policy, assists the President of the Russian Federation in determining main directions of the foreign policy.
70. The Security Council of the Russian Federation defines main directions of the foreign and military policy, forecasts, identifies, analyses and assesses threats to Russia's national security, develops measures to neutralize them, prepares proposals for the President of the Russian Federation regarding the adoption of special economic measures with a view to ensuring national security, examines issues of international cooperation related to maintaining security, coordinates efforts by federal executive bodies and executive bodies of the constituent entities of the Russian Federation to implement decisions adopted by the President of the Russian Federation with a view to ensuring national interests and national security, protecting the sovereignty of the Russian Federation, its independence and state integrity, preventing external threats to national security.

71. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation develops a general strategy of the foreign policy of the Russian Federation and presents relevant proposals to the President of the Russian Federation, implements the foreign policy course, coordinates the activities of federal executive bodies in the area of international relations and international cooperation, and coordinates international relations of the subjects of the Russian Federation.

72. The Federal Agency for the Commonwealth of Independent States Affairs, Compatriots Living Abroad, and International Humanitarian Cooperation assists the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation in pursuing a uniform foreign policy line in terms of coordinating and implementing programmes on international humanitarian cooperation, as well as in the implementation of state policy in the field of international development assistance at the bilateral level.

73. Other federal executive bodies carry out international activities in accordance with their powers, the principle of foreign policy integrity and in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation.

74. The constituent entities of the Russian Federation engage in international and foreign economic contacts in accordance with their powers and in coordination with the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, taking into account
the important role of inter-regional and trans-border cooperation in the development of relations between the Russian Federation and foreign states.

75. When preparing and implementing foreign policy decisions, the federal executive bodies work with the chambers of the Federal Assembly of the Russian Federation, Russian political parties, the Civic Chamber of the Russian Federation, non-profit organizations, expert and academic community, cultural and humanitarian associations, the Russian Orthodox Church and other traditional Russian religious associations, business circles and mass media, contributing to their participation in international cooperation. The broad involvement of constructive social forces in the foreign policy process promotes national consensus on foreign policy, assists in its implementation, and plays an important role in terms of more effective resolution of a wide range of issues on the international agenda.

76. Extra-budgetary resources raised on a voluntary basis through public-private partnership can be used to finance foreign policy activities.